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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
VS. 
REID H. ELLIS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
CASE NO. 890366-CA 
Priority - 3 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION; 
The basis for this appeal, is found in 78-4-11, 
UCA, and under Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of three 
separate offenses; Assault on a Peace Officer, Possession of 
Alcohol, and Retail Theft. He had made timely Motions for 
Change of Venue , to Dismiss and for Suppression of 
Evidence, all of which were denied. He appeals from all of 
these actions of the Circuit Court 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES: 
The following issues are presented for Review: 
1. Whether the court erred in refusing to grant 
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue. 
2.Whether the court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to change a charge of "Interfering with a Peace 
Officer", a class "B" misdemeanor to a charge of "Assault on 
a Police Officer, a class "A" misdemeanor. 
3. Whether the officer arrested the Defendant 
2. 
illegally, ie. without a warrant, for a misdemeanor occuring 
outside his presence. 
4. Whether the Court erred in not suppressing 
evidence obtained after an illegal arrest, without warrant. 
5. Whether the Court erred in not overturning a 
conviction based on evidence so lacking and unsubstantial 
that reasonable men could not reach a verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES & CASES: 
The Defendant considers the following to be 
determinative of the issues herein: 
1. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution; 
" The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and siezures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be siezed." 
4th Amendment, U.S. Constitution . 
Identical wording to that quoted above in Art.I, 
Sec 14, Utah Constitution. 
2. Utah vs. Bradshaw 541 P2d 800, photocopy set 
for in Addendum #1. 
State vs. Mendoza 748 P2d 131 , photocopy set 
forth in Addendum #2. 
State vs. Hygh, 711 P2d 264, photocopy set 
forth in Addendum #3. 
State vs. Gallegos, 712 P2d 207 , photocopy set 
forth in Addendum #4. 
3. 
State of Washington vs. Dresker 693 P2d 846, 
photocopy set forth in Addendum #5. 
State of Oregon vs. Roberts 706 P2d 564, 
photocopy set forth in Addendum #6. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
Defendant was arrested in Laketown, Rich County, 
in connection with a report phoned in by the proprietor of 
the Old Rock Store, in Laketown, to the County Sheriff, in 
Randolph, some 20 miles away, that she may have had a 12 
pack of beer stolen by a group of teenagers. (Transcript of 
Motion to Suppress, p.5; Trial Transcript, P138) 
The Sheriff, who was not present when the alleged 
theft occurred, did not have a Warrant. (Trial Transcript 
pp. 51 thru 54). His informant told him that there were 
four boys involved, but when the beer was allegedly taken, 
one boy (the defendant) was not in the store, but was 
waiting in the car. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress, 
Testimony of Renee Early, pp 8-9) Neither the store 
proprietor or the Sheriff was sure, at the time of their 
phone call as to which three boys were involved, and which 
one was not. 
The Sheriff went to the Bear Lake Cabin belonging 
to Defendant's mother's family, the Hardings, where he 
placed Defendant under arrest, and took physical custody of 
him, based solely on the phone complaint from Mrs. Early. 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, p. 53, 54 & 55) The 
Sheriff marched Defendant around the cabin to where the 
other boys were, the Sheriff saw a can of beer, unopened on 
the floor beside a bed. He put a handcuff on Defendant. 
4. 
The boys demanded to see his Warrant of Arrest, and/ or a 
Search Warrant, (the Sheriff was not wearing a uniform or a 
badge) and demanded that he leave the cabin if he did not 
have one, (Trans, of Motion to Suppress, p.59) he replied 
that he did not need one, and proceeded to forceably attempt 
to cuff the Defendant's other wrist, which action Defendant 
resisted.(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, pp 260, ) The 
action of the Defendant, knowing he had committed no offense 
is justified, (See Utah vs. Bradshaw 541 P2d 800, Addendum 
#1.) 
The other boys, who until then were sitting on 
their beds, protested the use of such violence by the 
officer; the Sheriff then pulled a loaded pistol from his 
belt holster, brandished it in the faces of the boys, and 
dragged the defendant, by the one fastened cuff, across the 
cabin. The defendant braced his feet on the doorframe and 
refused to go with the sheriff, who then went back to his 
car and radioed for assistance. His call was responded to 
by two State Park officers, a Fish and Game officer, and a 
Utah Highway patrolman. 
Two 15 year old boys went up to the sheriff to try 
to reason with him, and get the sheriff to talk to their 
father on the telephone. The sheriff handcuffed them to the 
fence. The five armed officers, with loaded pistols and 
shotguns, and a police attack dog then proceeded to raid the 
cabin, forceably and violently throw down and handcuff the 
Defendant and another 18 year old boy who were pleading all 
the while for the officers to talk to their father, and 
attorney, on the phone. 
After taking the boys to Jail, in Randolph, the 
sheriff obtained a Search Warrant from the local Justice of 
the Peace, Raymond A. Cox. The Sheriff and other officers 
searched both the cabin, and the defendant's car, and 
found no evidence of the 12 pack of Milwaukee 3est Beer 
allegedly stolen from Mrs. Early. 
5. 
The defendant and other 18 year old boy were 
issued misdemeanor citations, charging him with theft, under 
76-6-602 UCA, Illegal Possession of Alcohol under 32A-12-13 
UCA (both Class "B" misdemeanors) and Interferance with a 
Police Officer, under 76-8-305 UCA, a Class "B" misdemeanor. 
They were arraigned the same day, November 14, 1988, before 
the Justice of the Peace, who after receiving pleas of "Not 
Guilty" on all charges, released defendant on his own 
recognizance. The sheriff however refused to release the 
boys, claiming he was going to file additional charges, so 
that Defendant's father had to put up bail, and receive the 
permission of Judge Perry, the Circuit Court judge to take 
the boys, before the sheriff would release defendant. Six 
weeks later, the County Attorney after having the charges 
transferred to the Circuit Court, filed an Information, 
charging the Defendant with : 
Retail Theft, under 76-6-602 UCA (CI. "B") 
Unlawful Possession 32A-12-13 UCA (CI. "Bn) 
and Assaulting a Police Officer, 76-5-102.4 UCA, (a 
Class "A" misdemeanor, and a totally different and more 
serious offense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
POINT I: 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A CHANGE OF 
VENUE. 
POINT II: 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE 
CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES. 
POINT III: 
DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT 
6. 
FOR A MISDEMEANOR ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S 
PRESENCE. 
POINT IV: 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ILLEGALLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE, OBTAINED WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
POINT V: 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING A CONVICTION 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS SO LACKING AND UNSUBSTANTIAL THAT 




THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Defendant made a timely Motion for Change of 
Venue, based on the fact that in the tiny county of Rich, 
that he, as a "Summer people", could not receive a fair 
trial. His motion was supported by the required affidavits, 
one from Defendant and another from Wayne Parry, who 
testified as to the prejudice against outsiders in Rich 
County, where he resided from age 15 thru 18, and where he 
was constantly hassled by Sheriff Cockayne and his 
department. 
The County seat in Rich County is in Randolph, 
population around 500. The sheriff is a resident of 
Randolph. (Trial transcript, p. 105). Five of the six 
jurors are residents of Randolph, the sixth is from 
Woodruff, three miles away, population 200. 
the total population of Rich County is only 1615. 
7. 
Seven of the 17 member jury panel had heard of the case, 
(Trial Transcript, pp. 8 thru 23) through neighborhood 
gossip or were acquainted with the officers personally, so 
that defense counsel had to either waive one of his 
statutory challenges or come back on a subsequent date. 
Several of those jurors selected had heard gossip about the 
case. 
The signal case on Change of Venue is of course 
State vs. James, 99 Ut Adv. Rep. 14, decided January 6, 
1989, copy of which is attached as Addendum #7. The factors 
necessary to see that a fair trial is accorded are, as the 
court found in State vs. James; Standing of Accused and 
Victim in the community, Size of Community, Nature and 
Gravity of Offense, Nature and Extent of Publicity. 
In this case, in a county where there is no newspaper, where 
the jurors living in the same or next small town denied 
knowing the Sheriff, a lifelong resident, with 8 years in 
police work, and where defendant is accused of Assault on 
the same officer, it defies logic that those jurors could 
give a fair decision. The Jury Verdict, flying in the face 
of the store owners admission that this Defendant was not 
present in her store when the alleged shoplifting occurred 
only evidences the underlying truth: the defendant could not 
expect a fair trial in Rich County. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE 
CHARGES TO DIFFERENT AND MORE SERIOUS CHARGES. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (77-35-4 
(d) UCA), allows amendment of an Information, subject to 
certain limitations: 
8. 
"The Court may permit an indictment or Inform-
ation to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced.w 
In this case, Defendant was originally given a 
Citation to the JP Court, where he was arraigned November 
14, 1988, the day of the incident and entered "Not Guilty" 
pleas to : 1. Theft under 76-6-412 UCA, a Class "B" 
misdemeanor; 2. Illegal Possession of Alcohol under 
32A-12-13 UCA, a Class "Bn misdemeanor and 3. Interferance 
with a Police Officer under 76-8-305 UCA, a Class "B" 
misdemeanor. Defendant was released on his own recognizance. 
The Sheriff illegally refused to release the 
Defendant; stating that he intended to file even more 
charges. The undersigned then contacted Judge Perry of the 
First Circuit Court in Logan, who verbally ordered the 
release of the Defendant upon the posting of one thousand 
dollars in bail. 
On November 1, 1989, the County Attorney filed a 
Motion to Transfer, which Judge Cox, the JP, signed November 
4, 1988. On November 22, 1988, the County Attorney filed an 
Information charging Defendant with: 
1. Retail Theft, under 76-6-602 UCA, a Class "B" 
misdemeanor; 
2. Unlawful Possession of Alcohol under 32A-12-13 
UCA, a Class "B" misdemeanor (the only charge not changed) 
3. Assault on a Police Officer under 76-5-102.4 
UCA, a Class "A" misdemeanor. The last charge is not only 
different as to the elements of the offense, and one 
calculated to prejudice the jury, because it alleges a 
physical attack on the Sheriff, but it imposes a much more 
potent penalty. 
9. 
Two of the three changes noted are obviously in 
violation of Rule 4 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted 
infra. Both changes are "different charges", and obviously, 
changing from the Interfering charge to the Assault charge 
would prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT WAS • ILLEGALLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT 
FOR A MISDEMEANOR ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUT OF THE OFFICER'S 
PRESENCE. 
The Defendant was arrested by the Sheriff at the 
Harding Haven cabin some two hours following an alleged 
shoplifting incident at the Old Rock Store. The officer did 
not have a warrant for the arrest of defendant, and in fact 
the defendant was not even in the store when the alleged 
incident occurred. (Suppression Hearing Transcript P 8-9) 
77-7-1 UCA defines "arrest", as an "Actual 
Restraint", and allows no more use of force than is 
necessary to effectuate the restraint. 
77-7-2 UCA allows a peace officer to arrest 
without a Warrant, only if the offense is committed in his 
presence, or if it is felony which the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe was committed by defendant. 
In this case, the sheriff knew that at least one 
of the boys had not even been in the store when the alleged 
shoplifting occurred. He arrested defendant solely on the 
report of the shopkeeper. (Trans, of Motion to Suppress, 
pp.51,52,53,54) . The sheriff admitted that at the time he 
told the defendant "come with me", the defendant was in 
custody.(P 53.). 
The sheriff attempts to buttress his position with 
the assertion that he could smell alcohol on the breath of 
10. 
the defendant, but it is noteable that he refused to give a 
requested breath test to really find out who was telling the 
truth. (Trial Trans, p.182) What the sheriff wants to do is 
quickly skip over the illegal arrest, and try to find some 
other basis for an arrest, ie. an alleged smell of alcohol, 
and an unopened can of beer, but those pieces of evidence, 
are tainted by the fact that there was no warrant for 
arrest, and evidence illegally obtained is not admissible to 
justify a false arrest. Chimel V. California 395 U.S. 752; 
89 S.Ct. 2034: 23 L.Ed. 2d 685. The first prerequisite is 
that the officer is lawfully present, and that he is within 
parameters of the Arrest statute. 77-7-2 UCA. Sheriff 
Cockayne was not, his arrest of the defendant is defective, 
and subsequent patching on of illegally obtained evidence 
should be prevented by this court as a protection guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and Article 1 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING ILLEGALLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE, OBTAINED WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT. 
Closely related to the question of lawfullness of 
a Warrantless Arrest, is the question of Illegal Search and 
Siezure. 
Defendant made a timely motion under Rule 12, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to suppress all evidence 
obtained pursuant to both an unlawful arrest, with out 
warrant, and an unlawful Search and Siezure, effected 
without a Search Warrant. The ruling of Judge Perry is 
found on P. 66 of the Transcript of the Motion to Suppress. 
The Court confuses the law. Said Judge Perry: 
11. 
Testimony of the—Mrs.Early establishes reasonable 
cause for believing that the persons had committed 
a public offense, even though not in the officer's 
presence. Section 77-13-3 (sic, apparently meant 
77-7-2) provides that where an officer has 
reasonable cause and he thinks that it's possible 
that the persons may destroy or conceal evidence 
of the commission of the offense or flee the 
jurisdiction, he can make the arrest before a 
warrant may be obtained. * 
That statement of the court is in itself, 
reverseable error. The court confuses .probable cause as a 
basis for ignoring the requirement for a Warrant. The 
officer, in order to make a lawful arrest, must have both 
probable cause, and a warrant, or to have been present when 
the alledged offense occurred. (State vs. Mendoza , 748 P.2d 
181) . Probable cause is not a substitute for either the 
warrant, or the officer's presence at the scene. The Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires 
..."no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be siezed." 
The Judge tries to justify his manifest error, by 
throwing in the gratuitous proposition that if the officer 
has reasonable cause to think that the defendant may either 
destroy the evidence, or conceal it, or flee the 
jurisdiction, that the officer can make the arrest without 
warrant. It is noteable that the prosecution did not say 
one word about such exception to the Warrant requirement, 
nor did any witness. The sheriff did in fact obtain a 
warrant, very quickly from Justice of the Peace Cox, it was 
signed by the Justice at 3:44 PM, after the boys had all 
been arrested, and transported to Jail. (Trans, of Motion to 
Suppress, pp 60, 61). 
The sheriff had claimed to the boys that he did 
not need a search or arrest warrant, (Transcript of Motion 
12. 
to Suppress, p 43; Trial Transcript p. 260. 
The Utah Supreme Court delineated the need for a 
specific Search Warrant, in State vs. Gallegos, 712 P2d 2(17, 
and declared that the decision as to what may be siezed, and 
what may not, is a judicial decision, as opposed to 
administrative (eg. by the sheriff), See P 209, headnote 
2-3, and footnote 8. 
The purpose for the Constitutional prohibition 
against unlawful searches and siezures, is to protect the 
privacy and personal rights of citizens from intrusion by 
law enforcement officers. The case in point is a good 
illustration, an innocent defendant, not even present when 
the alleged crime being investigated, is arrested, just 
because the Officer makes a self serving decision that he 
has reasonable cause, and does not therefore need a Warrant 
from a judge. Because the lower court did not properly 
protect that innocent young defendants rights, a jury finds 
the defendant guilty, not only of the crime which he 
obviously did not commit, but two others flowing from it. 
The jury even finds defendant guilty of Assaulting a Police 
officer, when the obvious fact is that the officer illegally 
assaulted the defendant. 
A search, without warrant, or Search Warrant, is 
illegal; even incriminating evidence, like an unopened can 
of beer, is tainted, when as here, the officer is not 
lawfully on the premises. The officer's selfserving claims 
that he entered with permission, totally refuted by the four 
boys, will not redeem the original unlawful entry, nor make 
valid, the illegally siezed evidence. (Gallegos, infra, p. 
211.) 
The sheriff, after entering the cabin, found an 
unopened can of beer. He noted that the boys disavowed any 
knowledge of the beer.(Trans, of Motion to Suppress, p.57). 
13. 
The explanation for the beer being found in the cabin was 
supplied by Sandra Harding, see Trial Transcript, pp 322-323, 
which left the sheriff with no evidence of shoplifting, of 
any kind, which would justify the arrest of Defendant. Even 
the pretextual search of the cabin, after the sheriff did 
obtain a Search Warrant, failed to produce any of the 
supposedly stolen 12 pack of Milwaukee's Best Beer, or the 
package, or any cans, empty or full. (See copy of the Search 
Warrant, and affidavit of Sheriff Cockayne, obviously based 
on heresay, which turns out to be false, Addendum #8.) 
There was no basis for the court finding that 
there were "Exigent circumstances11, justifying warrantless 
entry into the cabin, (see Oregon vs. Roberts, 706 P2d 564;) 
since no evidence was even introduced on the subject, it was 
improper for the judge to throw away defendants constit-
utional rights in such a fashion. 
See also, State V. Hygh 711 P2d 265, discussing 
the fruitlessness of an after the fact search made with a 
Search Warrant, "a mere pretext" ( p. 267,268.) to try to 
cover up the original unlawful search and seizure. 
POINT V: 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING A CONVICTION 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS SO LACKING AND UNSUBSTANTIAL THAT 
REASONABLE MEN COULD NOT REACH A VERDICT OF GUILTY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
There has already been ample discussion of the 
fact that the prime witness, Renee Early, proprietor of the 
Old Rock Store, exculpated this defendant, saying that he 
was not even present when the alleged shoplifting occurred. 
Defendant filed a timely Motion to Dismiss Count 
II, Retail Theft, after Mrs. Early's testimony, which the 
14. 
court turned down, on the theory that the Prosecution might 
produce some evidence that the Defendant might be 
implicated. None was ever produced, the Defendants motion 
should have been granted. The sheriff himself admitted 
having no evidence of Aiding and Abetting, (Trial Transcript 
p.140.) 
Likewise, with respect to Count I Assault Against 
Police Officer on duty, there was evidence that until the 
officer slapped a handcuff on the Defendant, he had been 
totally cooperative (Trial Transcript, p. 143). The officer 
had complete control of the situation, he could, if he had 
completed his investigation before becoming physical, have 
determined that the unopened can of beer had been left by 
Mrs. Sandra Harding, and that it was not part of the 12 pack 
allegedly stolen from the Old Rock Store. 
Instead, the officer elected to use force and 
violence far beyond what was called for. He cuffed the 
defendant, threw him down on a bed and tried to forcefully 
handcuff defendant. That does not add up to evidence of an 
Assault on a Police Officer; it might be Interferance, if 
the Officer was effecting a lawful arrest, but he was trying 
to arrest the wrong person. (See the rules as to quantum of 
evidence required to exclude every reasonable doubt other 
than the defendants guilt, State vs. Lamm, 606 P2d 229; 
State vs. John, 586 P2d 410, 411. 
It is interesting that in the separate actions 
against the other boys, that all charges were dropped 
against Shane Miller, age 15; the other 15 year old, Lee 
Ellis was acquitted of the charges of Shoplifing and 
Assault, and was found guilty only of Interfering. The 
other 18 year old, Mark LeFevre was charged with five 
offenses. He had a prior record, so was coerced thru the 
multiplicity of charges, into plea bargaining to avoid going 
15. 
to prison. He plead guilty to the shoplifting charge, 
(notwithstanding the total lack of physical evidence of any 
such offense), and Interfering. Only this defendant, the 
one who was palpably innocent of the original shoplifting 
charge, has been found guilty of all three offenses. 
The ruling of the Circuit Court, upholding an 
obviously biased decision of the Jury is a miscarriage of 
Justice, which it is incumbent on this court to correct. 
SUMMARY: 
1. The defendant should, in order to have received 
a fair trial, have had his Motion for Change of Venue 
granted. Six jurors, all living in the same or adjoining 
town where everybody knows everybody, with the sheriff, who 
obviously knew, and were either fearful of or loyal to the 
Sheriff, found defendant guilty on such thin and 
unsubstantial evidence, that no reasonable man could find, 
on that evidence, that Defendant was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
2. The County, obviously sure of it's ability to 
convict defendant, proceeded to "throw the book" at 
defendant; charging him initially with three Class "B" 
misdemeanors, and then amending by the Information, to 
charge two Class "B" offenses, and one Class "A", This 
crass violation of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
exposed Defendant to additional and more serious punishment, 
an obvious violation of the Rule. 
3. The Sheriff's arrest of Defendant for shop-
lifting was a classic violation of the Arrest statutes. The 
offense, a misdemeanor, occurred outside the officers 
presence; the arrest was without warrant. Picking the one 
obviously innocent boy of the four illustrates why Warrants 
16. 
of Arrest are required, to avoid punishment of the 
guiltless, based on the officer's inadequate knowledge of 
the facts. 
4. A warrantless search and siezure turned up only 
one unopened can of beer, which subsequent facts proved 
without doubt, belonged to a previous user of the cabin, not 
to defendant. The officer's unwarranted invasion of the 
privacy of defendant and others should have resulted in 
suppression of the evidence, which would have obviated an 
unjust verdict. 
5. The presumption of innocence, requires that a 
defendant be convicted of a crime only when the evidence is 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime 
has occurred. This case is the result of bias on the part 
of a jury, influenced by a sheriff with a reputation for 
hasseling teens. The evidence should have resulted in a 
verdict of not guilty, failing which the Court should have 
granted relief. 
This multiplicity of errors by the court, in all 
justice needs to be reversed by the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th of October, 1989. 
17. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE: 
I hereby certify that I mailed ten copies of the 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaint i f f and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Alien BRADSHAW, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14060. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., of intentionally interfering with 
a law enforcement official seeking to ef-
fect an arrest, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Courtfl&^JJ^J^Jitld that the stat-
ute under which defendant was convicted 
was unconstitutionally vague. 
Reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
Henriod, C. J., filed a concurring opin-
ion. 
Ellett and Crockett, JJ., dissented and 
filed separate opinions. 
Criminal Law <S=>13-1(2) 
Statute making any person guilty of 
a misdemeanor when he "intentionally in-
terferes with a * * * law enforcement 
official seeking to effect an arrest or de-
tention of himself * * *^f^^gjWrof 
|t7e|i>r r%J^ V K~ g"^j^+ to various meanings 
and interpretations, fails to inform ordi-
nary citizen who is seeking to obey the 
laws as to conduct sought to be proscribed, 
and ^herefo^S Vncoqatitiitional as pM-
i*&B3jfmfat without ^rsi^k^JSm^wA 
I ^ ^ J a w ^ L j ^ i ^ - C . A . 1 9 5 3 , 7 ^ 
305; Const, art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 4. 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for de-
fendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
John O. Christiansen, Beaver County 
Atty., Beaver, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
After a trial de novo in the district court, 
defendant was found guilty of violating 
Sec. 76-8-305, U.C.A.1953, as amended, 
which reads as follows : 
A person is guilty of a class B niisde^ 
mtmm when he intentionally interferes* 
JpPl: person recognized to be a law en-
iofcement official seeking to effect an 
arrest or detention of himself or another 
xegardless of whether there is a legal 
haj^Jftc^fec arrest: 
The defendant was sentenced to serve six 
months in the county jail. From the ver-
dict and sentence the defendant has ap-
pealed claiming that the statute above re-
ferred to is invalid on constitutional 
grounds. 
The complainant is a policeman of Mil-
ford City, Beaver County, Utah, who ob-
served the defendant driving an automobile 
on the streets of that city. The officer fol-
lowed the defendant to a service station 
where he informed the defendant that he 
was going to issue the defendant a citation 
for driving while his driver's license was 
suspended. After the defendant had com-
pleted the purchase of gasoline he drove 
away from the service station a short dis-
tance to a hotel where he resided. The of-
ficer followed the defendant in a patrol 
car with the siren going. At the hotel, the 
dele53aTrF"Was operating an automobile dur-
ing suspension was untrue, and the defend-
ant did in fact have a valid driver's license. 
It is doubtful whether or not the record 
supports the conviction of the defendant 
inasmuch as the officer made no effort 
AVi>&-Diw( *7 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 5U P.2d 800 
Utah 801 
to take custody of the defendant, and it is 
doubtful whether or not the act of the de-
fendant in simply ignoring the officer is 
an interference with him. On appeal we 
are only concerned, however, with the de-
fendant's challenge to the statute. In pass-
ing we point out that the officer accused 
the defendant of violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Code, and the provisions of that 
code should have been followed by the of-
ficer in dealing with the purported viola-
tion. The provisions of Sec. 41-6-166, U. 
C.A. 1953, are controlling in situations sim-
ilar to the one herein. A pertinent part 
of that section is as follows: 
Whenever any person is arrested for 
any violation of this act punishable as 
a misdemeanor, the arrested person shall 
be immediately taken before a magistrate 
within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been com-
mitted and who has jurisdiction of such 
offense and is nearest or most accessible 
with reference to the place where said 
arrest is made, in any of the following 
cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands 
an immediate appearance before a mag-
istrate. 
* * * * * * 
(4) In any other event when the per-
son arrested refuses to give his written 
promise to appear in court as hereinafter 
provided, or when in the discretion of the 
arresting officer, a written promise to 
appear is insufficient. 
On appeal the defendant contends that 
the statute under which he was charged 
and convicted is invalid in view of the pro-
W^^^^0L^^ch rea<*s a s follows: 
»Ikft ffcght^ of the people to be secure 
is their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures j | | j i j ^ ^ no 
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889. 
2. Henry v. U. S.f 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 
4 L.Ed^d 134; Wong Sun v. U. S., 371 U.S. 
541 PJZd—51 
warrant shall issue but upon probabfe" 
cause supported by oath or affirmation* 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
While the particular problem raised has 
not been before this court, the &ngnage 
pf, the Utah Constitution was taken verbl-
immd uui the langtiage ~ef* ttcr-Fottrtfc 
TOffendment to the jEqiSficStion of the 
UataA-Jfcrtear^ States Su-
preme Court in dealing with the particular 
problem in the case of Terry v. Ohio,1 at 
page 16 of the U. S. Reports, 88 S.Ct. at 
page 1877 had this to say: "It is quite plain 
that the Fourth Amendment covers 'sei-
zures' of the person which do not eventuate 
in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for crime—'arrests' in traditional ter-
minology. It must be recognized thafWhe** 
«erer a police officer accosts an individual 
and restrains his freedom to walk away, 
he has 'seized1 that person.1* Tterr*Case 
went on to hold that arrests without a war-
rant may only be made upon probable cause. 
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court 
are to the same effect.2 
The language of the particular statute 
we are here dealing with is undoubtedly 
subject to the constitutional challenge of 
vagueness. That part of the statute "re-
gardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest" may be subject to various 
meanings and interpretations. 
rdtia€& by incarceration be 
"
tnfBftdSi—mt w i U ^S^ subminG"**!*^ 
Same is m vtoiatioirgti*^ an| 
^^atJll i l l l lMIMipiMI ••HI iwl TfHi 
arrarj^ cause and witife 
6u l E lw&-%^, lor the- frfrcssUyLikewise 
th»-WIK^ ^falttlfet'es^ ar treed in the stat-
ute withtftrt further definition or elabora* 
471, 83 S.Ct 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L. 
Ed.2d 349; People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 
74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33. 
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tion may mean any protest or verbal remon-
stration with an officer as well as the em-
ployment of physical force to avoid an ar-
rest. We are of the opinion that the lan-
guage of the statute as above pointed out 
fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is 
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct 
sought to be proscribed. H n JtHMW in iW 
gai"ticiiUi^*«bovc referred to is in violator* 
of the Constitution of this State and the 
United States and therefore invalid. 
This matter is reversed and remanded to 
the district court to dismiss the complaint. 
t h ( ^ l f e » * a w ! 5 g i « 5 jfistoi—necessary 





^rf^SSmTXi h7mmS23$r do with 
th*«««*liuu ul Uli lMffTO 
«te applicable to the facts and basic issue 
here. They had a lot to do with Hitlerism, 
and in my opinion, the subject statute con-
ceivably may be knocking at the door of 
some such eventuality. In such case^jgii* 
fer w j t l } i r 4 » i ^ ^ W ^ 
t ^ i S r ^ K c r f n a t the pre^afffffO^f^stimp-
ti Justice (concurring), ^mrh^ttskvo^ of constitutionality justily-
rc6ncur,~the while conceding that this irlg~a six-month sCTCtdi iy^aiy-^JnjgQ^o^k^ 
may be a close case, and that the argu*^*' 
ments of the dissents about law and order 
and the integrity of the constabulary, are 
peals of optimism for a desired socio-politi-
cal community. Nonetheless, I am con-
vinced that they have neglected the liberty 
bell, whose chimes presumably reach the 
ears not only of the shackler but the shack-
lee, and presumably reflect each's constitu-
tional prerogative of equality,—the hall-
mark of which is reasonableness. I take 
it that any set of circumstances that out-
distances such sounds might be said to 
constitute a journey out of the realm of 
constitutionality as we understand it. 
In this case the officer in the first in-
stance said he was going to issue the de-
fendant a citation for driving while his li-
cense was suspended. He did not arrest 
him, or threaten him with an arrest. Mil-
lions of citations are issued daily without 
an arrest. The defendant did not object 
to a citation, nor did he resist an arrest at 
that time, but drove away a short distance 
followed by the officer, who arrested him, 
claiming he resisted arrest,—not borne out 
by the facts.1 
im&tirt *srafutT ffiaT^fHrtieafcin' 
arrest of a citizen by a "recognized" law 
enforcement officer, popularly looked up-
on as a person in a blue, brass-buttoned 
suit, ornamented with a silver star over his 
heart (but who may be an imposter in rent-
ed garb), which citizen is minding his own 
business, a a ^ ^ * ^ 
er 
^^^m^fHem *f whether there is a 
^ M J ^ ^ 4 ^ I4i mvttt m not, as was th^ 
In such case, the presumption in favor of 
constitutionality successfully is rebutted, 
and as generally is the rule, disappears, and 
the presumption of innocence that always 
attends a defendant, destroys the former, 
the latter to persist. Facts well may be 
instrumental in its persistence. 
The dissents say there is no constitutional 
question here since there is no search 
and seizure problem involved. The main 
opinion points to Terry v. Ohio 2 and other 
authorities3 that seem to disagree,—which 
authorities have my preference over such 
unsupported generality. 
I. One of the dissents suggests that we must 
ignore the facts, they being the function of 
the jury. Another suggestion seems apropos 
that without the facts, the unconstitutionality 
of a statute is a subject only of a declaratory 
judgement that ignores the fact of consti-
tutional right of liberty. 
2. Footnote 1, main opinion. 
3. Footnote 2, main opinion. 
STATE v BEADSHAW 
Citea^1P'2d80° 
Utah 803 
I respectfully disagree with the gratuifv 
in one of the dissents to the effect th^ 
'Nowhere in the statute can it be iouxfi 
that an unreasonable arrest is permitted ^r 
encouraged." I suggest the subject statu*e 




seems by implication or legerdemain, to V* 
an arbitrary exercise of poor judgment 
but in doing so interferes with an office*"* 
—it costs him six months deprivation 0* 
his liberty. 
ever except to touch his fellow, tawu-sawkfi* 
an officer, and actually walke4 JU*«P • f • mn'1 
an inaide&tJ&al the office* *•***, ~ « w 
ated. 
The facts and hypothetics recited here 
are not for the purpose of deciding this 
case on the facts, which one of the dissents 
ihwfl&Ht iiiSwrimm mift* erroneously said we could do, but to dem-
WSS&
 rDnstrate the vagueness of the statute, and 
the door it opens ostensibly, on a pretext 
of false constitutionality, to events leading 
;to an unconstitutional invasion of the con-
stitutional right against unreasonable sei-
zure, a guaranteed right of privacy and a 
"constitutional assurance of right of free lo-
comotion and freedom from harassment and 
incarceration,—all in virtue of a statute 
that Me^s^^^a^idkiulous discrimination m 
^ll^ji^£iMiJHll^€eiiient official and 
a^uft^?,wn,i^rihwiiile law-abiding citizen 
wfwJ^P#^1a!t1Si|ClLffie expense of 
and wtjffiiffiiSrs^ the illegal 
, _ _ _ , . „ ^ of ficiaT;jf*To me this 
4Sas up to an Eleventh Commandment, to 
pgo hence and defy the law hiding behind 
bt badge, and let him who is without sin, 
4ut interferes in the lawlessness, to serve 
4W sentence. 
fc^eems to me to be somewhat of a de-
parture from reality and practicality and 
^ven morality to say a statute is constitu-
tional that says one person can violate the 
law and by virtue of such illegal act induce 
another to indulge in a confrontation which 
he did not seek and get six months because 
a possible tormenter, acting illegally, goad-
ed him into it. It is a rather superficial 
answer to say, as do the dissenters here, 
that having perhaps unwittingly "inter-
fered" in an arrest, with the sometimes 
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that 
notation so vague as to render a statute un-
constitutional, in my opinion. Does one inter-
fere with an officer if he heckles him, refuses 
to leave the scene of a demonstration in which 
a person is being arrested, is a curiosity 
seeker at a fire where a suspected arsonist is 
being apprehended, a physician attempting to 
administer to a dying man who is being ar-
rested, etc.? 
_ipp,.._ 
as sheriffs, deputies, city policemen, to^n 
policemen, school crossing guards, constable 
town marshals, judges of various hues, ga^e 
wardens, treasury agents, tax collectors, ca**1" 
pus policemen, truant officers, forest range*"0' 
justices of the peace, district court judge0» 
Supreme Court Justices, sanitarians, agric^ *" 
tural agents, special police, meter maids, etc" 
ad infinitum. 
Utah Rep 533-542 P 2d—27 
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someone "might" attach to the word, the 
"interferer," acting in good faith, not hav-
ing read this funny statute, should be con-
tent to lose his job, his good name in the 
community, his liberty for six months, and 
his respect for the establishment, in ex-
change for the great privilege of hiring a 
lawyer, going to court to seek damages 
(which are no substitute for loss of free-
dom),—all because one of the countless 
hordes of law enforcement officials not on-
ly committed a pediculous, but illegal rip-off 
in making what is worse, ^m^^^^ 
person_^^^><5^a»Mj^^ JUflf^arr p*%jh%£ 
Scratic legislation in a free 
society, could resist arrest, and who as of 
now, can resist arrest if it happens to be 
classified as a citizen's arrest. 
This statute does not have any semblance 
of a reasonable, constitutional statute pre-
faced by a warning requirement of some 
kind, a reasonable request that the citizen 
show something, or that under the circum-
stances "probable cause" appears to justify 
an arrest, or "that there is reason to be-
lieve an offense has been or is about to 
be committed." 
One of the dissents asserts that it ap-
pears that the majority "is influenced by 
the facts of the case and seeks an impermis-
sible way to correct what it considers a 
bad verdict." Although this statement may 
be permissible gratuity as to others in the 




the dissents suggests that The 
main opinion is at some pains to explain 
how the police officer could have handled 
this apparently arrogant and belligerent 
defendant in a different manner." It does 
not take much imagination to answer that 
question. 
6. Two other cases cited in the dissent, Rosen-
berg v. State, and State v. Byrne, are Florida 
cases decided in Appellate Division Courts, in-
ferior courts not having the authoritative 
O r i e ^ a t a i l f ^ ^ 
i t J M f l f i W g f t HHBbTit to him. It is 
suggested that the dissent "is at some pains" 
to explain why the officer did not do one 
of the things mentioned above, QE*sSjdH 
threat^^CiW -4ri<iiJB«^M W W B S ^ S 
0M**M+"<iv£rr he- ccimiitted- a 'bre^di of 
flN^fteacenif the process of what pro¥c4»tQ 
ven^om gjt» i^k^-#»<? dlssente both say was 
the very purpose of the statute they say is 
salutary in keeping the peace. 
In passing, it is noted that neither of the 
dissents cites any authority that really sup-
ports the rule provided in the statute here. 
One, Miller v. State, a 1969 Alaska case 
(462 P.2d 421), at first blush would seem 
to. It may be pointed out, however, that 
the court there laid down a rule of law 
having no codification, which was similar 
to the provisions of our statute, saying that 
at least one state court had recommended 
such a rule as a matter of its common law 
development, being State v. Koonce, 89 
NJ.Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 1965,—an in-
termediate court but not the court of last 
resort, the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
However, the Miller case, supra, pulled 
its punches on any constitutionality ques-
tion, which was not even raised in the case, 
jvhen it said "It should be noted that the 
n i l c w e f o n n ^ ^ 
^^j^mmmmmmm^m^^imm in-
t&^m^^hmmm to be * peace officer. 
(^fe'iiaAofeffpiuTirLiiTs-arc then present." 
On the strength of such hedging, it is sug-
gested that this case, the only one cited in 
the dissent, certainly would be undispositive 
in an attack on a statute's constitutionality 
on the ground of vagueness.6 
weight of the Florida Supreme Court, having 
the same subordinate stature of State v. 
Koonce, supra. 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 511 p.2d 800 
I am of the opinion the statute cannot ant is entitled 
stand a true test of constitutionality based 




ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
annot agree that the statute 
Ty To the provision of our constitu-
tion. It does not permit an unlawful seiz-
ure (arrest) . It merely transfers the right 
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the or-
derly procedure of a court trial instead of 
a brawl in the streets.1 
The question of lawfulness of an arrest 
may be a close one, and a brawl may result 
in a killing. The legislature was wise in 
passing the statute in question in the in-
terest of maintaining order and preventing 
confrontations which might lead to blood-
shed. Nowhere in the statute can it be 
found that an unreasonable seizure (ar-
rest) is permitted or encouraged. There is 
no change in the law that one making an 
unlawful arrest must answer for it, and 
so there is no basis for saying the statute 
conflicts with the Constitution. 
The common law gave a person the right 
to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have 
changed since the time when self-help was 
permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest. 
At common law, arrests were often made 
by citizens. Judges were not available for 
speedy release on bond, and trials were long 
delayed. Such conditions no longer exist. 
mm 
pot ht 
I. Milter v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 
1969) ; Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68; 
State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annota-
tion in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases 
holding it a crime to resist a known officer 
when making an arrest even absent a statute 
like ours. 
^"^m 
3. Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
5. Sec. 78-3-5, U.OA.1953. 
to bail in a reasonable 
amount.3 Besides the statute does not pre-
vent resistance to an unlawful arrest when 
made by a private person. It only applies 
to arrests made by a known police officer. 
By both our constitution4 and statute,5 
#le ruling of the district court in cases ap-
pealed from a justice of the peace court is 
final except as to cases involving the con-
stitutionality of a statute.6 This matter is 
such a case, and so we must limit our re-
view to the determination of whether the 
statute is invalid. We may not review the 
facts of the case. 
It appears that the prevailing opinion is 
influenced by the facts of the case and 
seeks an impermissible way to correct what 
it considers a bad verdict. 
That is the function of the trial court— 
not that of an appellate tribunal. If we 
wish to be jurors, we should renounce our 
position as justices and wait until our 
hames are drawn for jury service. 
In reviewing a statute to ascertain its 
Constitutionality, certain rules of construc-
tion must be applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed 
to be valid and in conformity with the con-
stitution.7 
(b) It should not be held to be invalid un-
less it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be incompatible with some particular 
Constitutional provision.8 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity 
§f an ordinance or statute is upon the one 
Vho makes the challenge.9 
§. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 
41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed. 
603 (1897) ; State v. Iloltgreve, 58 Utah 563, 
200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American 
Fork City v. Robinson, 11 Utah 168, 292 P. 
249 (1930). 
7. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ; 
Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 
234 (1948). 
ft. Cases cited note 1 supra. 
9. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., supra note 7. 
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In the case of State v. Packardia it was 
said: 
It is recognized that statutes should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is 
any reasonable basis upon which they may 
be sustained as falling within the con-
stitutional framework [citations omit-
ted], and that a statute will not be held 
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensi-
ble, practical effect may be given it. 
[Citations omitted]. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Roth v. U. S.11 said: 
. . . This Court, however, has con-
sistently held that lack of precision is 
not itself offensive to the requirement 
of due process. ". . . [T]he Con-
stitution does not require impossible 
standards"; all that is required is that 
the language "conveys sufficiently defi-
nite warning as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by common understand-
ing and practices . . . " United 
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S. 
Ct. 1538,91 L.Ed. 1877. 
The case of Sunset Amusement Co, v. 
Board of Police Commissioners of City of 
Los Angelesu is in point: 
. It should be kept in mind 
that there are an infinite variety of ac-
tivities or conduct which could result in 
potential or actual danger to the "peace, 
health, safety, convenience, good morals, 
and general welfare" of the public. A 
municipality cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to isolate and specify those precise 
activities or conduct which are intended 
to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel 
[Daniel v. Board of Police Com'rs, 190 
Cal.App2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting 
from an earlier case, "To make a statute 
sufficiently certain to comply with con-
10. 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563 
(1952). 
stitutional requirements [of due process 
of law] it is not necessary that it fur-
nishes detailed plans and specifications 
of the acts or conduct prohibited." 
The author of the prevailing opinion ap-
parently doubts that the statute violates the 
constitutional provision regarding unrea-
sonable seizures as claimed by the appel-
lant. He seems to buttress the decision on 
the constitutional challenge of vagueness. 
This claim is personal to the author of the 
opinion, and was not raised either at trial 
or on appeal. 
I can see nothing vague about the lan-
guage of the statute in question. Any per-
son of ordinary intelligence should know 
that when a known officer is making, or 
attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or 
lay interference is prohibited by the law. 
In my opinion the statute is not uncon-
stitutional, and we are duty bound to so 
say and to affirm the judgment. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
With due respect to our disagreeing col-
leagues, I am impelled to state that the ma-
jority opinion impresses me as a strained 
effort to cast the statute in a light different 
from its true intent and meaning for the 
purpose of making it appear to be uncon-
stitutional and striking it down. It is my 
judgment that such a ruling is contrary to 
sound principles of law and considerations 
of policy. In addition to the cogent and 
correct observations of Justice Ellett, in-
cluding : that a legislative enactment should 
not be so nullified unless it is violative of 
some constitutional provision beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, I offer some further com-
ments. 
First, I re-emphasize that this statute 
does not authorize a peace officer to make 
12. 7 Cal.3d 64, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496 
P.2d 840, 845 (1972). 
Ill 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 
lL.Ed.2d 1498 (1956). 
STATE v. : 
Cite as 5 
an unlawful arrest. Nor does it authorize 
the seizure of any person or property. It 
does not deal with when or under what cir-
cumstances the lawful arrest may be made. 
That subject is dealt with elsewhere in the 
law.1 Neither does it in any way adverse-
ly affect or deprive any person who is sub-
jected to an improper or unlawful arrest 
of any right or remedy he has always had 
under the law. It seems inescapably plain 
to me that the sole purpose of this statute 
is to safeguard against interference with a 
peace officer who is attempting to make 
an arrest, to the end that violence may be 
avoided. 
This statute may be different than you 
or I, or the other justices of this court may 
desire it to be, or would have drafted it, 
had that been their responsibility. But I 
certainly do not think it is beyond the realm 
of rationality to see it as the expressed will 
of the people of this State, acting through 
their legislature, that when any duly au-
thorized peace officer is 'attempting to 
make an arrest, no citizen should interfere 
with him. If the arrest proves to be im-
proper or unlawful, whoever is aggrieved 
thereby is not without the remedies the law 
gives him, both in that case if it comes to 
court, and/or in another if he wants to sue. 
All this statute does is to make it a mis-
demeanor if he presumes to judge the law-
fulness of the arrest, and interferes with 
the officer in the performance of his duty. 
In considering whether it is within the 
power of the state legislature to enact such 
a statute it is important to have in mind 
that, as contrasted to the federal govern-
ment, which has only those powers express-
ly granted to it, the legislature of this State 
has all of the powers of sovereignty, ex-
cept only as expressly limited or prohibited 
I. See Title 77, Ch. 13, Utah Code Ann.1953. 
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by the constitution.2 It therefore has the 
power to enact any law or regulation cal-
culated to preserve the peace and good or-
der of the citizenry, unless some constitu-
tional provision prohibits it. 
The provision of our Constitution quoted 
and relied on as nullifying the statute is 
Section 14, Article I, relating to searches 
and seizures. It is submitted that if that 
section is considered in its total context, 
as rules of construction require, it will be 
seen that the purpose of that section is in 
accordance with its title "Unreasonable 
searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant"; 
and that it is dealing with the invasion of 
privacy by unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures of persons, houses, papers and effects 
and when the issuance of a warrant is 
necessary for that purpose, and not with 
the matter of making an arrest of the na-
ture involved here. I therefore do not see 
how that constitutional provision can prop-
erly be regarded as preventing the legisla-
ture from enacting a peace and good order 
statute such as the one in question, nor 
how it has any application to the situation 
dealt with in this case. 
We should look at the composite of this 
fact situation in a light supportive of the 
jury verdict, approved by the trial court 
in his denial of motion to set it aside. But, 
let it be conceded that the police officer 
may have been mistaken concerning the de-
fendant's having a revoked driver's license. 
The main opinion is at some pains to ex-
plain how the police officer could have 
handled this apparently arrogant and in-
solent defendant in a different manner. It 
wholly ignores the proposition that if this 
defendant had not been a person of that 
disposition, and if he had a valid driver's 
license on him as the law requires, he could 
359, 374 P.2d 516, and authorities therein 
cited. 
Z. To avoid repetition on this subject here, 
see statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 
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have avoided any difficulty for himself 
or the police officer by simply so stating 
and exhibiting the license. But he chose 
the contrary course which resulted in the 
difficulty in which he finds himself. 
I cannot see it as consistent with my ju-
dicial duty in the light of what I regard 
as correct principles of law and sound policy 
to align myself with the position of this 
defendant who obviously manifests a dis-
position to flout the law and authority, and 
place the burden of exemplary behavior 
on the peace officer who is trying to en-
force and uphold it. It is my impression 
that, quite different from the view taken 
by the jurors and the trial judge, the pos-
sibility exists that some members of the 
court may view the fact situation in this 
case as offensive to their sense of justice. 
If this be so, and the ends of justice re-
quire overturning the verdict, this court 
could very well do so by deciding that the 
peace officer was wrong and that
 #there 
was no justification for finding that the 
defendant was "interfering" with the peace 
officer making an arrest. I could not agree 
with that solution, beiieving that to be the 
prerogative of the jury and the trial court. 
But in my judgment that would be a solu-
tion more nearly rational and in conformity 
with proper judicial function and preroga-
tive than to strike the statute down to rec-
tify one seemingly harsh case. This would 
also be in harmony with the well-estab-
lished principle of constitutional law: that 
the court should not declare a statute un-
constitutional if the case can be decided on 
other grounds.3 
In any event, it should be indicated that 
it is unconstitutional only as applied when 
a person resists arrest as to himself or his 
family, and not remove its effect from oth-
er situations where its salutary purpose 
should be preserved. 
The STATEjfrf Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Lewis A. BANJKS, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Noll 13996. 
Supreme tourt of Utah. 
Octj2, 1975. 
Defendant wafc convicted after trial by 
jury in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Gordon Ej. Hall, J., of aggravated 
assault. Defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court held \that it was not error to 
admit into evidence a pistol which had 
been seized in closet proximity to where de-
fendant was arrester! and which was suffi-
ciently similar to thi gun used that gun ad-
mitted into evidence could serve for illus-
trative purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>4<W4) 
In prosecution wherein defendant was 
convicted of aggravated assault, it was not 
error to admit into evidence pistol which 
had been seized in \ close proximity to 
where defendant was larrested and which 
was sufficiently similar to gun used that 
gun admitted into evidence could serve for 
illustrative purposes. JU.C.A.1953, 76-5-
102(1)(c), 76-5-103(1) ft), (2). 
2. Searches and Seizures ^3.3(5) 
Where gun was fojund in close prox-
imity to where defendant was arrested, of-
ficers had right to takje it for their own 
protection. 
Jack W. Kunkler, Skit Lake Legal De-
fender Assn., Salt Lak£ City for defendant 
and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
3. See Heathman v. Giles, 18 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839; 16 Am.Jur.2d 301. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Adolfo Diaz MENDOZA, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Alberto Ruiz MENDIETA, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20922. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 1, 1987 
Evidence obtained during search of car 
A..' MIppreused by the Fifth District Court, 
>v . ^uiti'.'n County. J Harlan Burns, J., 
•*.
 ;
 the Stat*- appealed. The Supreme 
•. :. P-irbam, J., held that: (1) there was 
• ' rea.<»>nable suspicion for border patrol 
-ffi'vrs to stop north bound vehicle con-
vening "Latin-appearing" occupants and 
d^i-lawn^ California license plates; (2) 
K-^d faith exception to exclusionary rule 
•'"•i:".",ot apply to investigatory stop and 
*»-arch; and (3) the Fourth Amendment En-
forcement Act is unconstitutional. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring opin-
ion. 
Hall, C.J., and Howe, J., filed separate 
concurring and dissenting opinions. 
*• Aliens 0 3 3 . 8 
Border patrol officers' stop of vehicle 
•''•• interstate highway was not supported 
">' re-\ onable suspicion based on apparent 
l-itin descent" of occupants, route of trav-
*-. tunc of day, time of year, California 
- >i:»e plat<\>, "erratic" driving behavior in 
U;:U vehicle did not immediately vacate left 
k*e when officers approached at high 
*P*H then, after being tailed at distance of 
l
*o to six feet, switched to right lane and 
suddenly slowed down, and subsequent 
MENDOZA 
Ihl (Utah 19»7) 
nerv«>»:-•. h» 'hav | .»r of 
Cons t .Ar i . » nd . 4. 
Utah 181 
.^ U.S.C.A. 
2. Criminal Law C=>3«M.!<2> 
Good-faith exception to exclusionary 
rule can never apply to investigatory stop 
and search in that, if no reasonable suspi-
cion exists to justify investigatory stop, 
officer's conduct was not reasonable within 
meaning of the exception and, in any event, 
exception cannot operate where no outside 
authority on which officers reasonably re-
lied expressly authorized the search. U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law <3=39l.ii2) 
Searches and Seizures C=^ 12 
The Fourth Amende . T:t Enforcement 
Act is unconstitutional in purporting to cre-
ate a "good faith" exception to exelu.Merv 
ary rule with respect to investigatory 
stops. U.C.A.1953, 77-3o-i2(g); U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law <£=>394.i(2K 394.5(1) 
Searches and Seizures 0=12 
Even where "good faith" exception to 
exclusionary rule is applicable, the Fourth 
Amendment Enforcement Act is unconsti-
tutional, both in shifting burden of proof to 
defendant to prove police conduct in bad 
faith and in requiring illegal conduct that 
goes beyond being objectively unreason-
able. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12(g), (gM2)(i, ii); 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thompson, 
Salt Lake City, Peter L. Rognlie, St. 
George, for plaintiff and appellant. 
J. MacArthur Wright. John Miles. St. 
George, for defendant and respondent Men-
doza. 
John E. Meyers, Los An^de>. California, 
for defendant and respondent Mendieta. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The State brought th:< apical to chal-
lenge the trial court's suppression of evi-
dence obtained during a search of the car 
in which defendants were traveling. The 
State assigns as error the trial court's use 
of a probable cause standard to determine 
the validity of the stop, the trial court's 
1S2 t'tah 718 PACIFIC RKPORTKK. 2d SERIES 
find::-' that. defendants had standing to 
chal!'-ng«.' the validity of the search, and the 
trial court's failure to make findings pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-121 g) 
(VJH2). We affirm. 
The following summary of the facts is 
based on testimony from both the suppres-
sion hearing and the preliminary hearing. 
The trial judge relied on testimony from 
both in granting the motion to suppress. 
On March 16, 1985, two United States 
Immigration Service border patrol officers 
observed the northbound traffic on 1-15 
south of St. George, Utah, from a car 
parked on the median for that purpose. 
Their car was green, with official decals on 
both doors and a light bar mounted on the 
roof. At approximately 4:50 a.m., three 
cars approached the officer's position, in-
cluding the black Mustang in which defend-
ants were traveling. Officer Stiegler testi-
fied that his partner, Officer Fox, told him 
that the car deserved a closer look because 
the occupants appeared to be of Latin de-
scent. Officer Fox, however, testified at 
the suppression hearing that he could not 
remember making the statement concern-
ing defendants' apparent ethnic origin. 
Officer Fox, the driver of the border 
patrol car, pulled onto the highway and 
began to pursue the black Mustang. In 
order to catch up with it before it reached a 
rest stop, where the officers could view the 
car and its passengers with the aid of road-
side lights, the officers followed the Mus-
tang at high speed. When they caught up 
with defendants' vehicle, it failed to leave 
the left lane despite the officers' rapid ap-
proach; however, neither officer could tes-
tify that the occupants of the Mustang had 
seen the officers' car approach. The offi-
cers matched the Mustang's speed and fol-
lowed at a distance of two to six feet. The 
officers then noticed that the Mustang had 
California license plates. 
The Mustang eventually pulled into the 
right lane and decelerated rapidly. Both 
officers described the car's movements as 
"jerky." The officers pulled alongside the 
Mustang, dropped back, and then pulled 
alongside the car again. With the aid of 
the lights from the rest stop, the officers 
determined th.it defendants appeared to be 
of "Latin de*-c* :;.:" arid behaved "nervous-
ly." When asked to describe defendants' 
behavior more >:"ectfieally, however, the of-
ficers testified or.'.y that defendants avoid-
ed eye contact with the officers. Ba<ed on 
the time of year, the California license 
plates on the car, defendants' "nervous" 
behavior, defendants' physical characteris-
tics, and the "jerky" driving, the officers 
decided to pull the Mus.tang over and ques-
tion defendants concerning their citizenship 
status. 
The officers questioned both defendants, 
and neither was able to produce adequate 
identification. The officers arrested de-
fendants and placed them in the back of 
the officers' car. At this point, the officers 
opened the funk ol the Mustang to deter-
mine if it contained any other passengers 
and discovered the fifty-one bags of mari-
juana that were the subject of the motion 
to suppress. 
We consider first the propriety of the 
initial stop. The State contends that the 
trial judge improperly assessed the validity 
of the stop under a probable cause stan-
dard instead of the appropriate "reasonable 
suspicion" standard. The plain language 
of the suppression order does not, however, 
support the State's position. The order 
reads, "[Tjhere were no (articulable) facts 
as a basis or prcbacoe cause for the stop." 
(Emphasis added.) Use of the disjunctive 
indicates that the trial judge found not only 
a lack of probable cause, but also a lack of 
any basis whatsoever for the stop. The 
transcript of the trial court's ruling sup-
ports this interpretation. The transcript 
indicates that the trial judge found "there 
was no basis for the original stop," without 
making any reference to a lack of probable 
cause. Although inclusion of the probable 
cause language in the order confuses the 
standard applied by the trial court, that 
language does not indicate that the trial 
judge suppressed the evidence in question 
solely because the facts failed to meet the 
more restrictive probable cause standard. 
[1] Even under the "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard announced in United States 
v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 
STATK v. 
S.Ct 2571, 25*1, 45 L.Ed.2d r,07 (1075), the 
facts known to the border patrol officers-at 
the time they stopped the Mustang did not 
justify the stop. In Brignoni-Ponce, the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed the 
propriety of a stop, based solely on the 
"Mexican" appearance of a vehicle's three 
occupants, to investigate the possible trans-
portation of illegal aliens. The Court held, 
"Except at the border and its functional 
equivalents, officers on roving patrol may 
stop vehicles only if they are aware of 
specific, articulable facts, together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, that rea-
sonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles 
contain aliens who may be illegally in the 
country." Id. The sole fact relied upon by 
the border patrol officers in Brignoni-
Ponce was the "apparent Mexican ances-
try" of the vehicle's occupants. Id. at 88.5-
86, 95 S.Ct. at 2582-83. The Court held 
that apparent Mexican ancestry alone did 
not furnish "reasonable grounds to believe 
that the three occupants were aliens." Id. 
at 886, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court listed sev-
eral factors for consideration in determin-
ing if the officers had reasonable suspicion 
to justify the stop of the suspect vehicle: 
(1) the characteristics of the area, including 
its proximity to the border, usual traffic 
patterns, and previous experience with 
alien traffic; (2) information concerning re-
cent border crossings in the area; (3) the 
driver's behavior, including erratic driving 
or an obvious attempt to evade officers; (4) 
the characteristics of the vehicle itself, 
such as its size and observations indicating 
that the vehicle is heavily loaded; (5) 
whether the occupants of the vehicle are 
trying to conceal themselves; and (6) 
whether the occupants have a characteris-
tic Mexican appearance, i.e., particular 
style of haircut or dress. The officer is 
entitled to assess the facts available to him 
in light of his experience. Id. at 884-85, 95 
S.Ct. at 2581-82. In determining whether 
the facts support a reasonable suspicion 
that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity, 
the trial court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances facing the officers. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-
18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 
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(19M). The reviewing court should not 
overturn the trial ca r t ' s determination un-
less ft is clearly err- r.vous. Id. at 41'); see 
'also State v. Ga! leges. 712 P.lM 207, 20S-
09 (Utah 19N">). A review of the facts in 
this case indicates that the trial judge's 
order suppressing the questionable evi-
dence was not clearly erroneous. 
The officers in this case relied on the 
following facts in determining that they 
had a reasonable suspicion justifying the 
stop of the Mustang: (1) the apparent "Lat-
in descent" of the occupants of the Mus-
tang; (2) the route of travel; (3) the time ot 
day; (4) the time of year; (5) the California 
license plates; (6) the erratic driving pat-
tern; and (7) the nervous behavior of the 
occupants. 
As to the first factor, Officer Stiegler 
simply testified that the occupants of the 
Mustang appeared to be of "Latin de-
scent." He did not identify any character-
istics observed before the stop, such as 
clothing or haircut, that would indicate 
Mexican nationality. Many United States 
citizens and residents have physical charac-
teristics that might be classified as Latin. 
Without other observations concerning 
physical characteristics that would indicate 
alien status, Latin appearance has only mi-
nor probative value in determining if a 
suspect has entered the country illegally. 
Likewise, the Mustang's route of travel 
and California license plates have little pro-
bative value in determining if the officers 
had a reasonable suspicion to stup the ve-
hicle. The officers testified that 1-15 is 
frequently used by those involved in trans-
porting illegal aliens from the California-
Mexico border to destinations north and 
east of California. However. 1-15 is also 
the only major interstate highway for legal 
traffic to locations northeast of Southern 
California. It seems unlikely that illegal 
alien transporters comprise a significant 
portion of interstate traffic on 1-15 at dis-
tances as far from the Mexican border as 
SL George, Utah. 
Similarly, the time of year and the time 
of day of the £top have little relevance. 
Although the density of the traffic on 1-15 
varies, travelers use the interstate highway 
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at all times of the day and night and at all 
times of the year. See, e.g., United States 
v. Shields, 534 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1976). 
But cf. United States v. Quiroz-Carrasco, 
565 F.2d 1328, 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (defend-
ants stopped on a road at a time when 
virtually no local traffic was present). 
The officers also testified that they relied 
on defendants' erratic driving behavior in 
deciding to stop the Mustang. When asked 
to describe this behavior more specifically, 
however, they merely cited defendants' ini-
tial failure to yield the left lane to the 
approaching patrol car and their subse-
quent lane change and rapid deceleration. 
We do not see how this behavior would 
give rise to a suspicion that the occupants 
of the car were engaged in illegal activity. 
Defendants made no attempt to evade the 
officers; rather, they changed lanes and 
slowed down. If anything, defendants' 
conduct facilitated their apprehension by 
the officers. 
The final fact relied upon by the officers 
was defendants' "nervous behavior.' 
When asked to describe defendants' behav-
ior more specifically, the officers merely 
stated that defendants' had a "white-
knuckled" or rigid look and failed to make 
eye contact. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the failure to make 
eye contact can have no weight in deter-
mining if the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 
United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 
86-87 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Lo-
pez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir.1977). 
Additionally, several of the factors listed 
in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86, 95 
S.Ct. at 2582-83, are absent here. Defend-
ants did not try to evade the officers, nor 
did they attempt to conceal anyone or any-
thing when the officers began pursuing the 
Mustang. The car did not meet the typical 
profile of a vehicle used for smuggling, nor 
was there any indication that the vehicle 
was heavily loaded. See United States v. 
Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 
1984) (several factors including the appear-
1. The officers testified that license plates From 
other states on the United States-Mexico border, 
as well as those from states that arc the typical 
ar.ee of the occupants and the heavily load-
ed truck were sufficient to uphold an inves-
tigatory stop). Finally, the officers 
stopped the car a considerable distance 
from the Mexican border. 
Adopting the State's position would es-
sentially authorize the stop of all north-
bound vehicles on 1-15 containing "Latin-
• appearing" occupants and displaying sus-
pect state license plates.1 Such a holding 
would substantially interfere with the 
fourth amendment rights of those travel-
ers. We hold that the facts in this case do 
not support a reasonable suspicion that de-
fendants were engaged in illegal activity; 
therefore, the trial court's finding that the 
stop violated defendants' fourth amend-
ment rights was not clearly erroneous. 
Our holding that the investigatory stop 
violated defendants' fourth amendment 
rights obviates the need to discuss the pro-
priety of the search. Because we find the 
stop itself unconstitutional, all evidence 
subsequently sei.-.ed is inadmissible. See, 
e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L Ed.2d 441 (1%3); 4 
W. LaFave. Search and Seizure § 11.4(d), 
at 407-08 (2d ed. 1987). 
Our holding as to the unconstitutionality 
of the initial st ;»p also eliminates the neces-
sity to address the standing issue. Be-
cause the State' based its standing argu-
ment on the propriety of the search, and 
because the validity of the search does not 
affect our holding, we do not discuss de-
fendants' standing to challenge the search. 
We next turn to the State's challenge to 
the trial eoun's failure to make the find-
ings required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-12<g> <19>2). part of the Fourth 
Amendment Enforcement Act, Pursuant 
to that section, a trial court may only sup-
press evidence when it finds a substantial 
fourth amendment violation that was not 
made in good faith A defendant must 
first prove a substantial violation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The State 
must then prove good faith on the part of 
the police officer in order to prevent sup-
destinations for illegal alien traffic, would have. 
aroused their suspicion. 
STATK v. 
Cite as 748 PJZd 
pre .-.don of the evidence. The section fur-
ther requires the trial court to state its 
reasons for finding a substantial violation 
and a lack of good faith. In considering 
this assignment of error, we fir^t deter-
mine whether section 77-35-12(g) meets 
federal constitutional standards. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United 
States Supreme Court applied the exclu-
sionary rule to the states by virtue of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655, 81 S.Ct. 
at 1691. As a result, the United States 
Constitution requires suppression of evi-
dence seized pursuant to a search or sei-
zure made in violation of the fourth amend 
merit. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 
however, the Court created an exception to 
blanket application of the exclusionary 
rule. The Court held that the rule does not 
apply where the state establishes that an 
officer exhibited "objectively reasonable" 
reliance on a magistrate's probable cause 
determination and on the technical suffi-
ciency of the search warrant issued. Id. at 
922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21. 
Although Leon involved a search con-
ducted pursuant to a subsequently invali-
dated warrant, the State argues that the 
Leon holding does not restrict application 
of the "good faith" exception to warrant-
less searches. Admittedly, much of the 
language in Leon intimates a broader appli-
cation of the rule. While the State correct-
ly argues that no language in the Leon 
opinion specifically restricts application of 
the exception to searches pursuant to a 
warrant,2 we do not agree that it can apply 
2. We note that much of the language in Leon 
suggests a broader application of the rule. For 
example, the Court states that the exclusionary 
rule should not apply to objectively reasonable 
police activity and that this is especially true 
where the officer has obtained a search warrant 
and acted within i's scope. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
919-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3418-19. This language 
implies that all objectively reasonable police 
conduct should enjoy immunity from the exclu-
sionary rule and that obtaining a warrant has 
the effect of creating an even greater presump-
tion of validity of the police activity as long as 
the officer obtained the warrant in good faith. 
Because the statute, by its terms, applies to all 
motions to suppress evidence without distin-
guishing between motions to challenge warrant-
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to warrantless searches of the kind in-
volved in this case. 
The basis for the Leon exception is that 
the exclusionary rule serves no other pur-
pose than lo pur.ish law enforcement offi-
cers for knowingly or negligently conduct-
ing a wrongful search and to deter such 
conduct in the future. Id. at 918-21, 104 
S.Ct. at 341S-19. When, however, a police 
officer obtains a warrant and relies on it 
with objective reasonableness, exclusion of 
the evidence due to a subsequent invalida-
tion of the warrant would serve no pur-
pose. Id. Thus, the opinion's foundation 
is that excluding illegally-seized evidence 
when a police officer has received authori-
zation to conduct a search, has restricted 
his search to the boundaries of the.authori-
zation, and ha^ a reasonable basis for rely-
ing on the authorization would defeat the 
ends of jus?:ot\ 
[2] Whether or not we agree with the 
Leon view of the exclusionary rule's pur-
pose, the exception cannot operate in this 
situation for two reasons. First, no outside 
authority on which the officers could rea-
sonably rely expressly authorized the 
search of the vehicle; therefore, the policy 
foundations of the Leon exception do not 
appear in searches of the kind- involved in 
this case.3 
Second, the Leon exception, by its own 
terms, could never apply to an investigato-
ry stop and search. As we have already 
discussed, Brignoni-Ponce permits the use 
of evidence obtained during a search con-
ducted after an investigatory stop only 
less searches from motions to challenge 
searches conducted pursuant to a waiiant, only 
the broader application of the "good faith" ex-
ception suggested in the Leon dicta can justify 
the scope of the statute. 
3. In Illinois v. Krall — U.S. . 107 S.Ct. 
1160, 94 L.Ed.:d 364 (1937). the United States 
Supreme Court extended the Leon exception to a 
situation where the police conducted a search 
pursuant to a subsequently invalidated statute. 
Id., 107 S.CL at 1167. Krull does not affect our 
character&ation of Leon. In both cases, the 
officers conducting the searches did so in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on prior, external au-
thorization. 
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when articulable facts give rise to a reason-
able suspicion. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
at S-S4, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. In essence, this 
requires objectively reasonable conduct in 
the decision to search, the same objective 
reasonableness that an officer must exer-
cise when relying on a subsequently invali-
dated search warrant. If no reasonable 
suspicion exists to justify an investigatory 
stop, rendering a subsequent search illegal, 
then the officer whose conduct is in ques-
tion could not have acted reasonably. 
Thus, the Leon exception could never apply 
to an invalidated investigatory stop and 
search. 
[3J Because Leon could never apply to 
investigatory stops and searches, and be-
cause the Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act purports to create a "good faith" ex-
ception to such searches, that Act violates 
the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
[4] Even assuming for the sake of ar-
gument that the "good faith" exception 
established by Leon applies to the type of 
search involved in this case, the statutes in 
question here are still unconstitutional. 
Section 77-35-12(g)(l) requires defendants 
to establish a substantial violation of their 
fourth amendment rights. A violation is 
"substantial" under section 77-35-12(g)(2) 
if 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the con-
science of the court or was a result of 
the practice of the law enforcement 
agency pursuant to a general order of 
that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to 
harass without legitimate law enforce-
ment purposes. 
This threshold requirement is beyond the 
scope of the "good faith" exception for two 
reasons. First, Leon establishes an excep-
tion to the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 
3420. Pursuant to Mapp, if the defendant 
establishes a fourth amendment violation, 
the illegally-seized evidence must be sup-
4. The stop in this case and section 77-35-12(g) 
both fall below the standards required by the 
fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
pn*>>:."i regardless of the egregiousness of, 
or the intentions motivating, the police offi-
cers' conduct. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 
S.Ct. at 1691. Because Leon is an excep-
tion to the application of the exclusionary 
rule, the State must prove the necessary 
elements of the "good faith" exception. 
Section 77-oo~12(g}, however/shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant, who 
must prove the equivalent of police conduct 
made in bail faith before the court can 
apply the exclusionary rule. 
Subsections (i) and (ii) of section 77-35-
12(g)t2l also exceed the bounds of the ex-
ception established in Leon because both 
require less than objectively reasonable 
conduct in order for section 77-35-12(g) to 
provide an exception. Pursuant to the 
broad reading of Leon, a. court will not 
admit the illegally-seized evidence if it 
finds the police conduct objectively unrea-
sonable. Conduct that is objectively unrea-
sonable, however, is not equivalent to 
grossly negligent, willful, or malicious con-
duct: nor does it always arise from either 
an intent to harass or pursuant to depart-
ment policy. Because subsections (i) and 
(ii) of section 77-3o-12(g)(2) validate con-
duct that is nut objectively reasonable un-
der Ltu'i. they are unconstitutional. 
The state legislature indicated that if any 
part of section 77-35-12(g) was held inval-
id, the Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act would "be void in its entirety." H.B. 
69. 44th Leg.. Bud. Sess., 19S2 Utah Laws 
ch. 10. § 16. Thus, our holding that the 
substantial violation requirement violates 
the fourtl" an.tr.dment of the United State* 
Constitution renders invalid all of the stat-
utes passed in the Fourth Amendment En-
forcement Act. We therefore do not need 
to discus- the trial court's failure to make 
findings as to the officers' good faith.1 
Because we affirm on other grounds the 
trial court's order suppressing the evi-
dence, we do not; reach the issues raised by 
defendants concerning a possible Miranda 
^violation and the officers' lack of statutory 
authority to stop defendants. 
tution. We do not analyze the Ie\el of conduct 
required b\ Utah Constitution article I, section 
14. We rcsene this question for the future. 
STATE v. 
Cite a* 748 p.2x1 
Th- decision of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring). 
I join in the majority's analysis. How-
ever, I feel compelled to add several com-
ments. 
First, I find particularly outrageous the 
State's attempt to justify the stop of Men-
doza and Mendieta by citing the fact that 
they reacted anxiously to the pursuit and 
surveillance conduct of the two INS offi-
cers. In the 4:50 a.m. darkness on March 
16th, Mendoza and Mendieta were driving 
along 1-15 in the left lane. Suddenly, a car 
approached from the rear at a very high 
rate of speed. When it approached the 
Mendoza/Mendieta vehicle, it abruptly 
slowed down and then trailed Mendoza and 
Mendieta at freeway speeds, separated 
from their rear bumper by only two to six 
feet. Only the headlights of the officers' 
car were illuminated. In the dark, there 
was nothing that would alert Mendoza and 
Mendieta that the vehicle behind them was 
a police car. Mendoza and Mendieta then 
pulled into the right lane and slowed down. 
At this point, they appeared "nervous" to 
the officers. 
Any sane person would appear nervous if 
something like this occurred while travel-
ing along a lonely stretch of one of our 
interstates in the early morning hours. I 
find ludicrous the State's argument that 
because these individuals appeared to have 
been unsettled by the officers' extraordi-
nary conduct, the officers had justification 
for suspecting that something improper 
was going on, and on this basis, they were 
entitled to pull the vehicle over and insti-
tute an investigation that led to a search of 
the vehicle. This is pretextual fourth 
amendment gamesmanship at its worst. 
Second, I agree with the majority that 
the "good faith" exception suggested in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot be 
applied generally to warrantless searches. 
1. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
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However, even if this r».-adir.g of Leon were 
in error, the Fourth Amendment Enforce-
ment Act would not necessarily be saved. 
As I have observed previously in State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264. 271-74 (Utah 19S:>) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), the whole 
question of the protections that are afford-
ed by and the remedies available under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, our own search and seizure provision, 
has never been carefully considered by this 
Court. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring 
and dissenting). 
Application of the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review ! prompts me to concur in 
affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
However, I reserve judgment as to whether 
the exclusionary rule as espoused in Unit-
ed States v. Leon 2 has application to a 
warrantless search. I also reserve judg-
ment as to the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982) and wheth-
er it has application to a warrantless 
search. 
HOWE, Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur except I would not reach and 
determine the constitutionality of section 
77-35-12(g), also known as rule 12(g), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The majority 
correctly holds that the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule enunciated in 
United States v. Leon, 46S U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot 
apply to the warrantless search made in 
the instant case. Eor the same reasons 
and because of the inherent lack of good 
faith in their making, section 77-35-12(g> 
does not apply to such searches. See sub-
paragraphs (3)\ii) and (iii) of section 78-35-
12(g). 
I would not attempt to apply the statute 
to a fact situation it was never intended to 
cover (warrantless search) and then be-
cause it is unconstitutional as there applied, 
declare the statute unconstituuonal in all 
2. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1984). 
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per had obtained a copy of the petition, 
including the first and final accounting, 
al^ d had taken it to his legal counsel in S l^t 
Lake City prior to the October 7, 19&1, 
hea^ng. Appellants did not need to digest 
the etatire 233-page document prior to the 
hearing to enable them to object./Pages 
one anti two are a summary of the account-
ing in me form recommended bVthe pro-
bate division. The amount of th^assets on 
hand for\ distribution is unambiguously 
written on $he "bottom line" of the summa-
ry. This fapt alone, in light of appellants' 
allegations 6$ Zions' earlier representations 
regarding the value of the estate, should 
have sufficiently alerted them that some-
thing might be\awry and caused them to 
appear at the hearing. If appellants did 
not agree with the amount/shown on the 
summary, they haci more than ample time 
to appear at the hearing apd lodge an ob-
jection or ask for a Continuance to study 
the document. Continuances of this type 
are given as a matter \ of course by the 
court in probate proceedings. Additionally, 
appellants had three months in which they 
could have moved for relief under Rule 
60(b)(1) to (4). We acknowledge that the 
granting of a continuance^ discretionary 
with the trial court and that "[t]he right of 
a citizen to due process of Jaw must rest 
upon a basis more substantial than favor or 
discretion." Roller v. Holly,\ll6 U.S. 398, 
20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520 (1900). In 
Roller, the United States Supreme Court 
set aside an 1891 default judgment on due 
process grounds, holding that five days' 
notice to Roller, a Virginia resident, to ap-
pear in a Texas court was insufficient to 
allow Roller to travel to Texas, hire an 
attorney, and prepare his case. However, 
in these days of efficient rapid transporta-
tion and relatively inexpensive telecommu-
nications, we are less willing to allow dis-
tance alone to weigh heavily on oim review 
of the adequacy of the notice. Here, Phil-
lip C. Pepper had discussed Zions' petition 
with leg&l counsel in Salt Lake City prior to 
the hearing, but neither he nor his counsel 
appeared at the hearing to registers any 
objection. Under these facts, appellknts 
wer£ not denied due process of law. Fur-
ther, almost nine months expired before 
appellants raised their claim of lack of due 
process. Because Rule 60(bX7) requires 
suc\ a claim to be made within a "reason '^ 
able lime," the trial court did not abus^fts 
discretion in refusing to set aside theyOcto-
ber 8, 1981, order. 
Appellants also assert that notice to their 
mother, Fannie N. Pepper, wa/inadequate 
because sheVwas legally incompetent, and 
Zions was awkre of that. Although Phillip 
C. Pepper wak appointed/conservator for 
his mother by an Arizona court, he made 
no motion to join ms mother in the petition. 
Nor is she a partyyto/this appeal. Hence, 
we do not considerywhether her due pro-
cess rights were violated. 
We hold that the Court did not err in 
denying appellants' petition and in granting 
Zions* motion tp dismiss.\ Affirmed. Costs 
to respondent 
HALL, Ctt., STEWART 4nd DURHAM, 
JJ., and /DEAN E. CONQJER, District 
Judge, COTicur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein/ CONDER, District Judg^, sat. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 5> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Gillis HYGH, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19402. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson,^., of aggravated robbery, and 
he appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) inventory search of de-
STATE v. HYGH Utah 2 6 5 
Cite u 711 P-24 2M (Vinh 19&5) 
fendant's vehicle was not proper since it sonable searches cannot be evaded by label-
was pretextual and not conducted accord-
ing to proper procedures, and (2) trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting 
cross-examination of service station attend-
ant who was robbed by limiting question-
ing concerning the exact method of activa-
tion of surveillance camera during robber}*. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed 
opinion in which Durham, J., concurred. 
1. Arrest <S=71.1(1) 
Searches and Seizures C=3.3(4, 7) 
In order for a search to be constitu-
tionally permissible, a search warrant is-
sued by neutral magistrate and based upon 
probable cause is required unless search is 
'within an exception to the warrant require-
ment such as:,-limited search incident to 
lawful arrest, search of an automobile 
based on probable cause thai it contains 
contraband,.or seizure of evidence in plain 
view by one with a lawful right" to "be in a 
position to so observe i t" Const* Art 1, 
§ 14: U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures C=3.3(6) 
An inventory search constitutes an ex- y^ffv 
ccption to the warrant requirement a war-
rantless search of an imj»ounded vehicle for 
purposes of protecting police and public 
from danger, avoiding police liability for 
lost or stolen property and protecting own-
er's property is pcrmitt*. i by the State and 
Federal Constitutions. Const. Art. 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4. 
ing thern "inventory" searches. Const 
.Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures e=>3.3(6) 
In order that an inventory search of a 
vehicle be lawful, there must have been 
reasonable and proper justification for the 
vehicle's impoundment, either through ex-
plicit statutory authorization or through 
circumstances surrounding the initial stop. 
Const Ar t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 
4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <£=7(29) 
It is the state's burden to establish 
necessity for taking an inventory of a ve-
hicle. Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures c=3.3(6) 
Search of automobile was not a valid 
inventory search, since it appeared to be a 
pretext for a warrantless search and offi-
cer did not follow proscribe procedures in 
that' officer did"nut" involve owner of ve-
bine, who_was present-.in his derision \6 
conduct search, rather than permitting 
owner to make othtr cv- position of vehicle, 
-officer did not completely .starch the ve-
hicle or make !I.-t of nrm- foand. and offi-
ce* had sent another officer t<» retrieve 
photo of r^M^ry -u.p^ct f.en hef'-re ask-
ing defendant (>r h;> u- <'.M and registra-
tion, uaited for ph**to before b»>':.\ning 
search, arid searched uith picture in hand. 
Const Art. 1, § 14; US C.A. f <•.'.-' Amend. 
4. 
3. Criminal Lau c=a*9J.4<3) 
Searches and Sii/urt* 0=>3.3tl) 
Contraband or othtr tvi !• nee of crime 
di-ruvered in a true ir.w:.ti<r\ ?»a.rch may 
be seized without a u arrant and introduced 
into evidence at trial. O r.st Art. 1. J 14; 
U.S.C.A. Con^tAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures C=3.3<1) 
Inventory'^earch-tXCcption to iht war-
rant requirement d'*;-not a;^!y ~;.cn the 
inventory i* rntrcfv a pret» \ ! f - v r ^ f ^ f air 
invt .^G^atory j*ot?rc mmn~r~ ?:rr^a??v_ntal 
co: 
8. Criminal Law C--f,r,2.7 
Right to confrontation includes right to 
cro.-.-t xamine witnesses; however, this 
right is not absolute, as trial court has 
discretion in limiting scope and extent of 
cross-examination which will not be re-
wr.-ed on review absent an abuse. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
3. Criminal La* C-662.7 
Vi ^ati-.n of cunfrur 
i.ati'-n c-'.ld r- ...My U e v ; 
- e <]'*s 
' > ami-
•'d to 
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have a substantial effect on jury's decision. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
10. Witnesses <S=>271(1) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in limiting defendant's cross-examination of 
service station clerk to preclude question-
ing as to exact method he used to activate 
surveillance camera during robbery, for 
purpose of authenticating photos of sus-
pect, since testimony as to how camera was 
activated could not reasonably be expected 
to have had a substantial effect en jury's 
decision in light of clerk's testimony that 
photographs depicted man who robbed the 
station in the act, his personal identification 
of defendant as the man in photo, and 
foundational testimony authenticating the 
photographs. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6. 
Edward Brass, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste-
phen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Gillis Hygh appeals a convic-
tion of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. U.C.A., 1953. § 7 $-6-302 (197S). 
Defendant alleges that the warrantless "in-
ventory search** of his automobile after he 
was placed under custodial arrest was un-
lawful. We agree. 
At about 10:00 p.m. on DecemU-r 31, 
1932. a man entered a service station in 
Salt Like City and asked for a pack of 
cigarettes. As the clerk handed the cus-
tomer the cigarettes, the customer pulled 
a .22 caliber revolver from under his coat 
and ordered the clerk to empty the cash 
register. The clerk did so, putting approxi-
mately $350 into a paper bag. As he was 
emptying the register, the clerk activated a 
1. A rejected inspection sticker is placed on a 
vehicle if the \chicle does not pass the annual 
safety inspection. The ouner of the vehicle 
then ha^ five days to complete repairs and briruj 
the vehicle back to be reinspccted. 
2. At the pretrial suppression hearinp. Officer 
Foster trstified: T h e reason I stopped him was 
surveillance camera that had been installed 
by the Salt Lake City Police Department 
the previous month. After the robber left, 
the clerk called the police. The police had 
also been alerted to the robbery by an 
alarm in the police dispatcher's office 
which went off when the surveillance cam-
era was activated. The police arrived 
shortly thereafter. The film from the sur-
veillance camera was unloaded by a detec-
tive ar.d taken for developing. Several of 
the developed pictures showing the rob-
ber's face and clothing were posted at city 
police stations on the line-up boards. 
Immediately after the robbery, the clerk 
identified the robber to police as a black 
man wearing a rust or red colored ski mask 
on his head but not over his face. The 
robber was also wearing a khaki colored 
coat with "furry" lining and with a rip over 
the left pocket The surveillance camera 
pictures showed this description to be accu-
rate. 
On January 6, 1983, a Salt Lake City 
police officer, Officer Foster, after 
stopping for a traffic light in the left lane 
next to defendant's car, noticed an expired 
rejected safety inspection sticker' on de-
fendant's lower left front windshield. Offi-
cer Foster also noticed that the driver re-
sembled the individual in the photograph of 
the rcM-ery suspect posted at the police 
'station. The officer testified at the hear-
ing U> suppress the evidence taken from 
defendant's car that he stopped defendant's 
car because of the expired safety inspec-
tion sticker.2 
After stopping defendant's car, Foster 
sent a second officer to the police station to 
get the posted photo of the robbery sus-
jK-ct Foster then checked defendant's 
driver's license and registration. The car 
was registered to defendant, but defendant 
had no driver's license with him. A radio 
because of the inspection sticker." At trial. Offi-
cer Fover was asked this question: "Was the 
parti ru*. ax reason that you slopped the Defend-
ant's \chide, did it have anything to do uith any 
phoros thai you had seen earlier that da> at the 
P*>!ice*s:a:.on?" He replied: That uas the rea-
son. >r-s.* 
STATE v. HYGH 
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call to the police dispatcher verified that 
defendant had a license, but also revealed 
two outstanding misdemeanor arrest war-
rants against defendant Officer Foster 
placed defendant under arrest on the basis 
of those warrants, handcuffed him, and put 
him in the patrol car. 
Foster then ascertained that defendant's 
passenger was not a licensed driver and 
called for an impound wrecker to tow the 
car away. 
After the second officer returned with 
the photo, Officer Foster conducted & 
search of defendant's car with the photo in 
his hand.1 He did not use an inventory 
sheet and did not make a list of the items 
found in the car.4 In the trunk, the officer 
found several jackets, a cap, several shirts, 
and a ski mask lying over the spare t ire 
The officer also found an unripped plastic 
gym bag. The officer looked inside the 
bag and found a .22 caliber revolver. The 
gas station clerk later identified the ski 
mask, one of the jackets, and the gun as 
those used by the robber. The clerk also 
identified defendant as the robber. After 
the search of the car, Officer Foster trans-
ported defendant to the police station. Of-
ficer Foster informed the robbery detective 
that he believed defendant was the robber 
of the service station. The detective ques-
tioned defendant, then ordered Officer Fos-
ter to place defendant under arrest for 
aggravated robbery. 
At a pretrial suppression hearing, de-
fendant asked to have the clothing items 
and the revolver taken from the car sup-
'pressed as being the result of a preU \tual, 
warrantless search. The motion was de-
3. The record indicates that Foster searched onl\ 
the trunk of the \chiclc 
4. At the pretrial suppression hearing. Foster u i i 
a^led: "When you impound a car. Officer, do 
you use an inventory sheet of v me lir.d"*" He 
replied. "So, I don't. Fcrsonalh I don't." 
5. Chime! v. California. 395 VS. 752. S9 S.Cl. 
2034, 23 LFd.2d 6S5 (1969). 
6. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 VS. 42. 90 S.Cl. 
1975. 26 L.Ld.2d 419(1970). 
7. CooUdge v. AVw Hampshire, 403 I S 443. 91 
S.Cl. 2022. 29 LEd.2d 564 (1971). 
cied by the trial court on the basis that the 
search was a proper inventory search. At 
a trial before a jury, defendant was convict-
ed of aggravated robbery. Defendant ap-
peals, seeking a reversal of that conviction 
and a new trial. 
[1]-Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution, and the fourth amend* 
me^t to the United States Constitution pro-
hibit unreasonable searches and seizures. 
I s order for a search to,be constitutionally 
permissible* a search warrant issued by a 
pc^iral magistrate and based upon proba-
ble cause is required. There are, however/ 
^evtral exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. These include a limited search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest;5 scorch of an 
automobile based on probable cause that ft 
contains contraband,J and seizure of evi-
dence in p!ain view* by one with a lawful 
right to be in a position to so observe i t 1 
[21 It is also well established that an 
inventor}* search constitutes an exception 
to the warrant requirement1 A warrant-
ies! search of an impounded vehicle for thp 
purposes of protecting the police and pubnc 
fK'"rrT"3ar.gcr* avoiding' police liability for 
lost £>r $to!tm property, and protecting the 
"owner's ^>j«erty,TTpermitte d by the fourth 
amendrueiU and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution.1 
[3. 4) Because inventories promote such 
important interests and are not investigato-
ry in purpose, they do not implicate "the 
interests which are protected when 
searches are conditioned on warrants." ,§ 
Therefore, inventor}* searches are not per 
se unreasonable within the rin r-.ning of the 
fourth amendment and article I, sect ion 14 
g. S.-.-//I IXilota v. Opptrman. 428 VS 364. 96 
S C: 3 ^ 2 . 49 L.Ed 2d 1000 (1976). S:ate v. Cole. 
l:;ih. 674 P2d 119. 126 (19S3). 
9. O-j'p.rK'.zn, supra note 8; Slate v. Romero, 
t-.2h ^24 r.2d 699 (1981); State v. Crabtrce, 
l /uh. 61$ P.2d 484. 4S5 (19S0). 
10. 0,;,rrrs% 428 VS. at 3S2-S3. 96 S Ct. at 
3103-04. 49 LEd.2d 1000 (Powell. J., concur-
nr.g). 
2 6 8 Utah 711 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Contraband or other evidence of crime dis-
covered in a true inventory search may be 
seized without a warrant and introduced 
into evidence at triaL,|" However, the Jn^ 
Tentory exception doe? not apply when the 
invu;tory is sorely "a pretext concealing 
an^lnvestigatoiy police mouve.^1^ Fiindas? 
mental constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches car.n:»; be evaded by 
labeling them "inventory" searches.^ 
15] In order to support a finding that a 
valid inventory search has taken place, the 
court must first determine whether there 
was reasonable and proper justification for 
the impoundment of the vehicle,11 This 
justification, and thus lawful impoundment, 
can be had either through explicit statutory 
authorization or* by the circumstances sur 
rounding the initial stop.14 flf impound 
n»t;nt was neither author::ei nor necessary, 
the search was unreasonable.1* 
Utah's statutes give a police dej artment 
authority to impound vehicles in several 
situations. Vehicles may lawfully be im-
pounded when they are ust-d to transport 
controlled substances, U.C.A., 1953, § 5S-
37-13; when the vehicle is irr.proj^rly reg-
istered or stolen, U.C.A., 1953. § 41-1-115; 
or when a vehicle is al ^r.i;:.ed, U.C.A., 
1953, § 41-6-116.10. j No fr-ecific statutory 
authority exists authoriiiug ;:;.^und of a 
vehicle stopped and parked on the str-et 
after the driver has K-en am'-strd. There-
11. S<f, e.g.. Hams %. I 'i.-.vi 5 : J : « . 3 > U ' 5 234. 
PS SCt. 992. 19 l.Fd.2d 1C*7 U c*5). R*t>e i 
Cofwwcaltk. 2:0 Ya. 1C}'\ 1033. > 5 S F. 2d 
746, 749 (19S0). 
12. Oppcrman. 425 IS a: 37c. ^ S C: a: 3100. 
13. State v. U.Dsn.el 156 NJ-Sjper 347. 3*4-
55. 3S3 A.2d 1174. 1177 U975) Steele Ar.no!.. 
Lawfulness of "lmer.'.orv Search" of Motor Ye-
h.cle Impounded b\ Pohce. 45 A L R 3d 537. 544 
(1973): 
Another c±**i»*+* f-rc;cq-:^ ':c 10 a valid in-
ventory *c:irch is ihr. the pc]>ct rousJ have 
taken lawful cutf <vH of ihc vehicle in ihe firsi 
1 m: Jnee. It his ' therefore been held that 
uhere ihc"cTrc'Lrr «.*::,-*« s^** that the ? ?\£C 
ihxd no authr>r??> !o irrr*"v~~d the \eh»c!e, or 
thai ponce cu>: JCLOI *.~e cf the %rhn»c \*a* 
r 4 riCvc-.s^rVj the interior^ zcziLh u a i un 
LrUuL ~ - - - " ' 
[ l . J ^ f J . - s : .Jv of *~ irr#^jr.!rd xe 
hide d <s rut of cv ' f d ;<~>e * . $ ihc con 
fore, we must look to the circumstances 
surrounding the stop to determine whether 
the impound was reasonable. 
[6,7] It is the burden of the State to 
establish the necessity for the taking and 
the inventor}* of the vehicle.1' In Salt Lake 
City, the police department has standards 
set forth in a procedural o rder n whose 
purpose is to implement a procedure for 
the handling of impounds and the use of 
wreckers. Under this order, city police of-
ficers are directed to impound a motor ve-
hicle of an arrested person. However, the 
vehicle may be released at the scene to 1 
party designated by the owner rather than 
be impounded,. A release form is provided 
to the officers to be signed by the person 
arrested designating an individual to take 
'charge of the vehicle and releasing the 
department and its officers from all liabili-
ty. 
Officer Foster testified that he did ascer-
tain that defendant's passenger was not a 
licensed driver. However, defendant was 
given no opportunity to arrange for disposi-
tion of his own car. The officer neither 
asked defendant whether there was some-
one who could come and get the car nor 
asked the p a s s e n g e r whether she could 
Lake po.-ses; ion of the contents of the car 
or gut M>r:,eone tn c^rne ^nd ge t the car. 
sutu: .i.ri.il n ^'.nn-merit of n .:•.•/r;:h!c.n.-«.s in 
regard fo v .u t ! . '^ thereafter made of such 
vehicle. 
14. S<-e. e.g. rV; . -"; jn . 4 : s L'.S. at 375-76, <* 
SCt at 3100, Copper \ California. 3?6 U.S. 58. 
61-62. 67 S.Ct. 7PS, 790-91. 17 L F.d 2d 730 
(1967); McDaniel 156 NJ.Super. at 355, 353 
A.2d at 1177, State 1 \f ntaguc. 73 Wash.2d 
3S1. 385, 43S P2d 571. 574 (1968). 
15. See State v. G~Jnch. Minn, 256 N W 2d 
506. 510 (1977). 
16. People v. Sagel 17 Cal.App 3d 492. 496-97. 95 
Cal Rptr 129. 132 (1971). See alo McD-i-.el 
15* N J S . p c r u: 359. 3^3 K 2d at 1179. 
17. Ordrr K^i:.\<t 1-79. ^[\^',.c d^c March 1. 
1979 Th»* r.-.f.r ;r. .r t: • -r.\ v ;••, ir.trr-,1 „ rd 
i: ma!. 
STATE v. HVGH 
Ote»»71IPJM2M (Vtah 19&5) 
The departmental order next establishes 
procedures affecting all impounds- In per-
tinent part, that order states: 
D. PROCEDURE [A]FFECTING ALL 
IMPOUNDS. 
1. When an impound occurs with the 
owner present, the officer should ask 
the owner if anything of value is in the 
vehicle, make certain the owner knows 
what steps are being taken to safe-
guard such property, and proceed as 
follows: 
a. The officer and the wrecker driv-
er should make a thorough inventory 
of the automobile, and fill in the im-
pound slip completely, listing all neces-
sary equipment on the car, in the car, 
and in the trunk. 
b. Any item lying loose in the ve-
hicle should either be turned o\er to 
the owner or locked in the trunk. 
Small and/or valuable items should be 
placed in Evidence for Safekeeping un-
less retained by the owner. 
Officer Foster did not ask defendant if 
anything of value was in the vehicle or tell 
defendant of the steps being taken to safe-
guard his property. While all this was 
taking place, defendant was handcuffed 
and in Fo>ter's patrol car. Foster thu« did 
Utah 269 
?tate "has not" met4U burdea-of sTfowiag 
[jhe necessitv for the seizure of iKTvehicIer 
We are not prepared to say that a true 
inventor}* search cannot be made in the 
presence of the vehicle's owner and with-
out his consent However, if the purpose 
of the search is truly only to inventor}* the 
contents of the vehicle and to safeguard 
them during impoundment, an indicia that 
such is the real purpose of the search is to 
consult with the owner of the vehicle when 
he is present at the time of the impound 
and the search.1* 
However, even if it could be determined 
that the impoundment itself was reason-
ably necessary, the search of the vehicle 
trunk was nevertheless not a valid invento-
ry search. As one commentator concluded 
after reviewing Oppennan: 
What is needed in the vehicle inventory 
context, then . . . is not probable cause 
but rather a regularized set of proce-
dures which adequately guard against 
arbitrariness. 
not give defendant any opportunity to ar-
range for disposition of his own jre'-vrty. 
Further, the vehicle was parked next to the 
curb in a lawful parking area; no valuables 
were visible, and defendant had not indi-
cated any were extant; a passenger was 
available to remove any valuables for safe-
keeping at defendant's request ard to ar-
range for a third party to remove the ve-
hicle; the car could have been leaked and 
left unattended; and no evidtr.ee was 
presented to indi a:»- that there w as a CuTr 
gw to police or pabl.c.1* k tMTca*fc, the'^ 
18. Sic /;« r.rrc!>\ An not Lj-.*fwV.r« of "l-ven 
r> Search" of M,.:<,r Vc* u'c Ir-^.-r.jrJ K 1 
li'cc. 4E ALR.3J 537 (1*73). 
Inventories should not be uphold under 
Op perm an unless the government 
shows that there exists an established 
reasonable procedure for safeguarding 
impounded vehicles and their contents 
and that the challenged police activity 
w as es.-entially in conformance with that 
pn-v'idure. This means that a \ \,r\ ru-d 
.inventory should be held unlawful when 
it L^  not shown, "for [instance], that stan-
dard inventory forms were i j > > . i*-d 
f*nd kepi fur future reference (sh^v. ing 
'presence or absence of valuables), nor 
that a place of safekeeping for valuables 
so Secured was maintained/'26 
The Salt Lake City Police Department 
dtni'S have a regularized set of procedures 
which are generally drafted to guard 
19. 5.-.V t Jc-*tll U 
n,enl of 
33= So.2J til. t}* i l ~ M . 
Cf 
.! I J n,eni o: \rVjclc p-sr- . .".! IJ L L K. J - } 
% 4I-1-H5. officers aV <-ed tfrfrrdjr.t 1 re 
move any iicms from \ehicle he w.v'cc to) 
£0 . 2 t-aravc. Scurch & Seizure § 7.4. at 576-77 
C*~r> (f".-:n^:r« r.mined) (quoting S.'dte v Jew-
e.V w,~'j note 19). S. c uho A<V~.V v. L-n£, 419 
M.ch 636. 3'9 N W 2d 1^ 4 (1-.-4) (inventory 
*e.v,K hc'J \r.\.-ild U,-.v:ve t>f lack of Mu..dard 
p ' ;e p'f-.rJ :rcs for ti,r.J-. \r.g :r.; entory 
v - . r ^ r s ) 
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against arbitrariness by an officer in the 
field. However, Officer Foster did not fob 
low these procedures. He did not involve 
the owner of the vehicle, who was present, 
in his decision. More importantly, the 
record indicates that he did not completely 
search the vehicle and did not mike any 
kind of a list of the items in the automobile, 
much less use a standard inventor}* form. 
Without this, the search cannot be fairly 
characterized as an Inventory search. In 
addition, Officer Fos'er sent another offi-
cer to the police station to retrieve the 
picture of the robbery suspect even before 
asking defendant for his license and regis-
tration, waited for the picture before begin-
ning the search, and searched with the 
picture in his hand, r Those facts indicate 
that the "inventory/* search was merely a 
pretext for a"warr^atlrs^ .-earch. Under"* 
these circumstance*, the e*IJence ciacoverva 
ed in defendant's trunk should h^ve been 
*suppre^ed as the rviul: of an ;mpru;^r, 
warrantless* search. Defendant's convic-
tion is thus reversed ar.d the case remand-
ed for a new trial. 
Defendant's second point on appeal is 
that the trial court denied defendant his 
constitutional right to be control ted uith 
the witnesses against him It-cause di ft-r.d-
ant's counsel was r.'>t alljut-d t^ cr*-ssex-
amine the State's witnesses s;*ee:fcal!y re-
garding how the survti'Lnce c^rr.^r- v as 
activated. Defendant argut d he ui-h-. i to 
present the defense of uh-.tht-r. :r. far;, the 
camera was activated at the time cf the 
robbery or could have :-•• n a;;iva!ei at 
some earlier time. The S*:.u- c:;« *:» d to 
cross-examination cor.a rr.ir.g the ]T*C:.-C 
method of activation, arguing that th». r.wd 
to maintain secrecy outweighed any r.evd 
defendant might have for the information. 
Tlie trial judge refused to allow cross-ex-
amination on that &sr»ect on the ground 
that it was not relevant givtn the sco;-e of 
direct examination. ^ 
2!. Fnher \: State. 7 Vk k?? 1. f-6. f-4? S U 2d 
571. 573-74 (1952). S:c:e %. Itr-.Ji-i -v : JO 
NM 2*0. 2M-62. 6?? F 7d 736. 73%?* '!*•*» 
At trial, the State offered as evidence 
photographs developed from the film taken 
from the surveillance camera on the night 
of the robbery. The gas station clerk testi-
fied that he had been instructed how to 
activate the camera. During the robbery, 
he did so while emptying the cash register 
of the money. The clerk further testified 
that he knew the camera was operating 
because of motor sounds and soft clicks 
coming from the camera. The police detec-
tive who had installed the crime-eye camera 
at the gas station testified that the camera 
was operating properly. He further testi-
fied that if the camera was activated, an 
alarm went off at the police dispatch office. 
Since installation, the camera had been acti-
vated and the alarm had gone off only 
twice: once on November 6 and once on 
December 31. The first time, on November 
6. the detective had returned to the gas 
station, reloaded the camera, and reset it. 
Trior to resetting the can,era, the detective 
made several exposures of his own face on 
the first few frames of the film to ensure 
that the camera was operating properly. 
The contact print of the film taken from 
the camera on the night of December 31 
shows the face of the detective in the first 
fevs frames, then the photos identified as 
th' se of defendant. Additional testimony 
was adduced from sevt ral officers which 
established the rh.iin of custody of the film 
and subsequently dr\t ]'•;•'d photographs. 
The tr.al ju'ij/e admitted the j !.• •tn^ra.phs. 
T;.t re are two basic theories upon which 
}h •'.••graphic evidence is admitted: the "si-
lt nt witness" theory and the "pictorial tes-
timony" theory.21 I'nder the first theory, 
pr^p'.rly authenticated photographs are "si-
lt, nt witnesses" that speak for themselves 
and constitute independent, substantive evi-
dence of what they portray, independent of 
a sr-onsoring witness." I'nder the "pictori-
al testimony" theory, the photographic evi-
dence is illustrative of a witness's testimo-
ny ard only Incomes admissible wht n a 
k I T ! '.V cd c . ;p ! r ' £ 4) . 3 J Wt^norc , Ew 
Ucr..c $ r>J <ChuJ'»> .^n rc\. 1^70). 
22 U S.r u!><> r-.:ted Sulci v G ?re. '* 
STATE v. HYGH 
Oie«*711P-24 264 fr'x»h 19*5) 
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sponsoring witness can testify that it is & 
fair and accurate representation of the sub-
ject matter based on that witness's person-
al observation.0 
The photos introduced at trial were intro-
duced under the second theory. The clerk 
was shown two photographs taien by the 
surveillance camera and a>'\ed if each con-
stituted a fair and accurate representation 
of the individual who con-.mir.ed the rob-
ber}', both the person and the clothes he 
was wearing. The clerk replied thai those 
photos were the robber in the act cf rob-
bing the station. Thus, the photos were 
authenticated by the testimony of a witness 
with knowledge that the photos were what 
they claimed to be: :< photos of defendant 
robbing the gas station.25 
[8] The right to confrontation irr'udes 
the right to cross -examine witnesses.^* 
However, this right is rot absolute. The 
trial court has discretion in limiting the 
scope and extent of cros.--t \..T.*nation.r 
Absent an abuse of that d:>:rvt:on. this 
Court will not diV.urb the ruling. 
Defendant's counsel had ample or-j-ortu-
nity to cross-examine the gas station clerk 
concerning the accuracy of hii memory of 
the individual robber and chthes. w i t h e r 
in fact the clerk did activate the cc.Ttra. 
and how he knew it was net:vat?-d. De-
fendant took full advantn^t of that ep;«or-
tunity. Defendant aSo hr.i tht. o:, . rtuni-
ty to cross-examine the p h.e c-.tr ; : ; .v n:;d 
officers who testify i cor.ccrr .r.j t>-. 5ur-
u-illance camera. The cn'.y q-—: •. de-
fendant was not a!:;vt-d to a-k v..• 5. r.~w 







•s not 0. 
T\<>\C 2 1 . 
*..?". 
. c -J r 
0 
L .i^> the lir.iuti. 
24. 5Uc L'fiiicd Ststcs » Afj.V^r. 439 fS.p? 103. 
105 (L.D.Pa 1977). KSic*. 7 K:'k \?p a: 6. 643 
SW.?d at c74; /V pU x /Y —.. *0 CV App.3d 
60S. 131 Ca! R p r . T - ' ! - \ M 
25. The photo^r^p! 
in:n*du*cd under 
The 1.'-re, v.c
 t», : 
lution of thjs jv*.r 
s \+:rc r.:' , " - 7 "fJ to be 
the "s > - ' v». ~rs*" thr\»ryj|f 
on the cross-examination coiiJd reasonably 
be expected to have a substantial effect on 
the jury's decision." Testimony a£ to how 
the camera was activated could not reason-
ably be expected to have had a substantial 
effect on the jury's decision in the face of 
the clerk's testimony that the photographs 
depicted the man who robbed the station in 
the act, the clerk's personal identification 
of defendant as the man in the photo, and 
the foundational testimony authenticating 
the photographs. Under these circum-
stances, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial in ac-
cordance with this opinion. 
STEWART and HOWE, J J , concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring Sep-
arately). 
I join in the Court's reversal of the con-
viction of defendant Hygh.
 fThe impound-
mer.t a^d search of defendant's automobile 
**!^:!c-d hi* right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures, as guaranteed 
ty the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and by article It section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. However, 1 
car.i.ot agree with two assumptions implicit 
in the majority opinion: first, that the 
scrr^> of the v.arrant requirement under 
article I, section 14 is congruent with that 
d«wh;- J by the federal courts under the 
fr'.irth ;.::*e.v!ment; st ond. that the reme-
dv It-r a 
;.re \rs 
\:< , 1 - * T Hon of I 'bh ' 
.i>ion is the same as th 
arch and 
edv e rt :u 
proviMon-fv-r a \." -!-.t:-»n of t he fi .! 
ch:> >r. of the e\ i-.ience se i r ed . 
7?.e A uYra/ Jaw r e g a r t / i n g w a r r a n t l e s s 
Sea rches and s e i z u r e s h a s b e c o m e a laby-
26. Cvxis v. Alaska. 415 VS. 30S, 316-17. 94 S.Ct. 
U05. 1110-11, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). 
27. Ckz~:bcn v. Mississippi 410 VS. 284. 295. 93 
SCi. 103!. 1045-46, 35 LEd.2d 297 (1973). 
2A. Lr :cd S:cres v. Famswnh. 729 F 76 11S8. 
11*2 (5:h C:r.l^ = 4). H»hha v Fcines. 641 F.2d 
?>:. -~"2i«:h C.r.19S1) 
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rinth of rules built upon a series of contra-
dictor}* and confusing rationalizations and 
distinctions. Police officers and judges at-
tempting to make their way through this 
labyrinth often imperil both the rights of 
individuals and the integrity and effective-
ness of law enforcement See, e.g., Wer-
miel, Recent Rulings Leave Police More 
Confused About lllict's Legal, Wall StJ. , 
August 9, 19S5, at 1, col. 1. In many cases, 
the exclusionary rule, adopted by the feder-
al courts as the sole remedy for fourth 
amendment violations, appears to have in-
fluenced, if not controlled, the scope of the 
constitutional right it was designed to fur-
ther. Many of the arcane rules developed 
to justify warrantless searches seem to 
have been fashioned solely to avoid the 
consequences of the exclusionary rule. 
Sound arguments may be made in favor 
of positions at ^variance with the current 
federal law respecting both the scope of 
the individual's right to be free from war-
rantless searches and seizures and the rem-
edy for any violation of that right Accept-
ance by this Court of such arguments un-
der the Utah Constitution's search and sei-
zure provision might result in simpler rules 
that can be more easily followed by police 
officers and the courts. At the same time, 
these rules might provide the public with 
greater and more consistent protection 
against unreasonable searches arid * enures 
by eliminating many of the confusing ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement that 
have been developed in recent years.1 
One way to impro\e predictability might 
be to sharply limit the sweep of e \npt i ns 
1. Recently, the United States Supreme C art has 
attempted to provide police with re!..: \c\\ clear 
standards for warranties* ai::"rr.. b.lc searches 
b\ vutrp-n^ ; i \u \ n.ans of the *uh:ic and in-
consistent rules that £>verned this area. In 
Inited States v. /?mj, 456 t'-S. 79S, 102 S.CL 
2157, 72 lid 2d 572 (1*?2). the Court held that 
if police off iters law-full) vop a vehicle, ihcy 
may conduct a warrantless search of all com-
partments and cr>n*i:r.cr* within the vehicle if 
t)ic\ h.ivt probable cause to bc!.e\c that cor.tra-
b.i.-.d is o-n.rj'-.d v/rr.-ewr.efe ir. the car. In my 
\ ; iw, this belated attc rr.pl to bring cc.nsistency 
^nd coherence to aut'>~ -< b:'e vrarches fails xx-
c.r.r.c it c»v.:::,j!!;,
 fc^:s the f< -r:h amendment'* 
w.»rr.:n! ft^ .:r;::::rt as it ;<:*....;.'. ;«j i«: . ::;o 
Kle uarc hes. Sec 4«f> I S at f27. 102 S Ct at 
to the warrant requirement that often raise 
questions of police overreaching. In their 
place, clear-cut rules could be adopted—for 
example, a flat requirement that a warrant 
must be obtained before any nonconsensu-
al search of property not in the immediate 
physical control of a suspect is conducted.1 
Such a rule would be an improvement over 
present law, both for the individual and for 
the police. The individual would be as-
sured that, in most cases, his property 
would not be searched or seized unless th^ 
reason for the search or seizure have first 
been presented to a neutral magistrate and 
a warrant issued At the same time, police 
officers would not be forced to speculate 
about what may or may not be subject to 
search without a warrant f? Warrantless 
searches would be permitted only where 
they satisfy their traditional justification1 
to protect the safety of officers or to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence,. Sec, e.g.\ 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-
C3, S9 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d G85 
(1969). Once the threat that the suspect 
will injure the officers with concealed 
weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, 
there is no persuasive reason why the offi-
cers cannot take the time to secure a war-
rant 
.Such a requirement would present little 
irr:p-.dijiiUit to police investigations, espe-
cially in !;^'ht of ihc ease with which war-
rant^ can be o! •.-i.v-'d under Utah's tele-
phonic warrant ^.:ute, U.C.A., U»53, § 77-
23-4(2) (19S2 t-d.i See Suite r. L*vczy 
,Ulah, C7G P.2d :^3 (ll^-i).' I\ .-haps most 
*:..] > rtar,t!y, .-jeh a r\i)e could be readily 
2174 (Marshall, ].. dis cntir.g) There is little 
reason to believe that effective law cnfoi ccn»cnt 
u quires this sacrifice of the interests protected 
by the w^riunt requirement. Set, e.g., The Su-
preme C(,urt—!9S! Term, 96 Harv.L.Rcv. 176, 
184-85 (19S2). 
2, Immediate physical control" refers to an area 
within which a supped could reasonably be 
expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence 
during an eiaountcr wan r* hce officers. The 
exception would be limited by its justification 
and would not ^.i.c-ally permit warrantless 
search's <'f car trunks, for example, or contain-
ers bevund the s-.i-; . J s rtuch. 
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understood and complied with by police of-
ficers, and evidence uncovered in compli-
ance with it would more than satisfy the 
requirements of the fourth amendment to 
the federal constitution. 
Sound arguments can also be made 
against acceptance of the federal version of 
the exclusionary rule as the sole remedy 
for unlawful searches and seizures. See 
ycncrally Coe, The A.L.I Substantiality 
Test: A Flexible Approaeh to the Exclu-
sionary Sanction, 10 Ga.L.Rev. 1 (1975); 
Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment 
Violations: Alteniath^es to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 69 Geo.LJ. 1361 (1951). Al-
though this Court has tacitly followed the 
federal lead on this matter, I have found no 
case in which this Court has decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule after indepen-
dently analyzing the question of what rem-
edy is available for an unlawful search or 
seizure under our state constitution. Per-
force, this Court has never considtred the 
appropriateness of possible exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule or the avai lably of 
alternative or supplemental remedies, such 
as the imposition of civil liability on police 
officers. 
I do not suggest that without further 
consideration this Court should either 
adopt the hypothetical warrantless search 
and seizure rule discussed above or reject 
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for viola-
tions of article I, section 14. I only contend 
that such arguments should not be fore-
clo.-ed from con [deration by our ur..ana-
lyzed acceptance of the federal f-.-i'Jon. 
The federal law as it currentlv c\:-:> is 
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 
IS Ga.L.Rev. 165 (1984); see also Massa-
chusetts r. Upton, 104 S.Ct 20S5, 20S9-91 
(19S4) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
k - E f l S r S T l M > 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY 
OF IRON COUNTY, Utah, a Utah non-
profit corporation, and Iron County, a 
body corporate and politic, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
• . 
Dennis LOWDER, individually and as 
county auditor of Iron County; and 
Clair Mulct, individually and as county 
clerk of Iron County, Defendants and 
Appellants, 
No. 19959. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
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certainly not the only permi.-sil 
tation of the .M-.irch and s<.!~-re pro! «••.""» 
contained in the Utah C«'r.-t::uti.»nJ 




can strike a balance between th<- cc~:> tinp 
interests involved so as to U t u r f ene 
them all, then we should not hesitate to do 
so. Sec generally Linde, E Plurih:.s — 
3 . Developing a jar i spruJcncc of state cc -*ntu -
tior.a* law is not a novel idea.. For cxarrp!?. ihc 
state of Washington has i n t e r p r e t J ;t c <: t j 
In/."..:! • -:/vh and seizure pre s;* •• ~< d (;?'t~.\l\ 
th -n the United States S-p:c:r.e C ,..rt h- • .;.:er-
pretrd the fu^. ih arr.ei.d 
County and its municipal building au-
thority% brought action agninst county offi-
cials. Seeking declarator)- rel; 
n;ar.i..rr,us to compel count> 
earn- out their alleged duti 
in*.t rt re- with county's plan for financing cun.-truc-
tion of new jail facility. The District 
Court, Iron County, George E. Ballif, J., 
upheld actions of county, and the county 
officials appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) debt of mu-
nicipal housing authority for which county 
was rot responsible was not subject to debt 
iri l7/^ i r ' - r : ; '> . S^jrihin^ for Theory. Article I, 
St.-::j* 7. 8 V. Put-ci $<rj~d L R c v . 331 (1955) . 
TJ.ej»'.^:c c f A ! J ' I a has also construed its search 
a " i v . ; j r c provis ion to provide \ • •. ivr protec-
t. rv Frr.cj, %.'S:.:te. Ah '• 3. f'., V ?d 727. 734 
•it 5 .7 N -/» Ssiz- (2*?3) 
STATE v. GALLEGOS Utah - 2 0 7 
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Second, the damage done by seizures pursuant thereto, are prima facie 
reasonable. 
challenge. 
wrongly deciding this case and encourag-
ing more ex-spouses to bring on baseless 
attempts to change custody far outweighs 
any harm to the Shioji children that would 
attend a reversal. We cannot let the fact 
that these proceedings have dragged on 
dictate the law we enunciate or the result-
we reach. Custody of the children should 
be returned to appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice, concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of Justice ZIMMEKMAN. 
K f Y N U M B t R S Y S U 
^ 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ross GALLEGOS. Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 203 49. 
Suprvme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 29, 1985. 
Defendant was convict' d in the Utah 
District Court, J. Robert Bullock, J., of 
theft by receiving, and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that. (1) 
€nUr defStittnit1riNM«^.lteed 
ifai march warrant and w**»fc*-ffc«»w* initK 
sts and conclude independent outside fnve$~ 
Order denying motion to suppress r e 
versed and case remanded. 
1. Searches and Seizures C=7(5) 
Search of c>;»>titutionally protected 
area pursuant to valid search warrant, and 
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>3.5, 3.7 
Dedsion. to seize must be judicial, as 
-apposed to administrative, and search war-* 
^rant must be'. sulfki^^; ; ' ;part ira tx* 
guide officer to thing intended to be seized, 
thereby minimizing danger of unwarranted 
inv!t5fmf"ofLprivacy., 
3. Searches and Seizures «s=*3.7 
Line between what is and what is not 
sufficiently particular in search warrant 
must be drawn with a view to accomplish-
ment of constitutional purpose of minimiz-
ing danger of unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy and necessarily varies with circum-
stances and with nature of property to be 
seized. 
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>3.7 
Without substantial justification, 
search warrants describing property only 
in generic terms are not favored by the 
law. 
5. Searches and Seizures <3=>7(8) 
Fojuctf* Amendment r^ufreliiffl^'ti^l 
iteijSeM^rseucS b* particularly describfd 
uggg^jPHjSHiii^ $v^ w,ft?¥ft n t 
HOBS required seizure of all " s k ^ n prop 
6. Searches and Seizures <e=>3.8<2) 
Assuming that affidavit by police offi-
cer was properly incorporated into March 
warrant, and thus, validated gener ! de-
scription pro\ ided in warrant, 
«attnorwrtmiract4>e<»£ 
awn chairs, electrical wiring, and 
children's :>vvtng as "stolen property." 
7. Searches and Seizures C=3.8(2) 
When, in coursejf^j^<ffMin£Jb*far 
Xirrhiiflr frinwrHitcrt on warrant, offkenr 
'mime across other articles of incriminatory"* 
Wtinrerihat "property ' may be proprrljr' 
seized tyjder p | 
8. Searches and Seizures c=>3.3(4) 
Y Warrantless seizure of property in 
plain view after lawful intrusion i- justified 
/%~t^n ^ 
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if officer is lawfully present where search 
and seizure occur, e\ idence is in plain \ lew, 
and evidence is clearly incriminating 
9. Searches and Seizures 0 3 8(1) 
upjn search warrant and while 
aO^ and conclude independent o u t s a i l v es-
tigation to obtain probable cause t*f*^eize 
nnnamed property, particularly where 
loQung about the nature or 
acter of property <*eizf d that 
L ^4Aeww*tlirMentifrable m being 
sjtplen, 
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen , Sandra 
L Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice 
A jury found the defendant Ross Galle-
gos, guilty of the crime of theft bv reced-
ing,1 a third degree felony On appeal, the 
defendant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court order denving his motion to suppress 
evidence and for a new trial 
I. 
On July 17, 1984, Pro\o City police offi 
cers went to Gallegos' home in Pro\o to 
execute a search warrant The w irrant 
ordered seizure of "all controlled sub-
stances and stolen property " \n affidmt 
in support of issuance of the warrant stat 
ed that an "informant did ste within the 
last 48 hours at least one pound of manjua 
na and several items proported [MC] b> 
Gallegos to be stolen (lawn chairs elec 
tncal wiring, children's swing, etc)" at 
Gallegos' home 
While searching the home, Officer Craig 
Geshson noticed a Magnavox VCR, at-
tached to a television set, and two video 
tapes close by He asked Gallegos about 
them and Gallegos remarked that he had 
rented them from Norton's suj>ennarket. 
Geshson call* d the police dispatcher and 
asked her to verify this information with 
Norton's. Norton's assistant manager ad-
vised the dispatcher that Norton's had not 
rented the VCR based on the fact that 
there was no rental contract on file under 
the name of Gallegos or Gallegos' girl 
fr end This inquir> took from ten to fif-
teen minutes After receiving this infor-
mation, Geshson examined the VCR and 
discovered that the serial number was 
mining When the defendant and his girl-
friend were unable to produce a rental re-
ceipt for the VCR, Geshson seized the VCR 
and the tapes A review of the record 
indicates that none of the property indi-
cated as being stolen in the affidavit was 
seized by the officers 
The following day, Geshson called sever-
al scores in the Provo area, trying to deter-
mine if the VCR was in fact stolen Even 
tuallv ownership of the VCR and tapes 
wa> triced to Sounds Easv, an audio-video 
store which reported them stolen from a 
customer's truck 
Trior to trial, the defendant made a mo-
tion to suppress evidence of tht discow H* 
of the VCR and the tapes in him home on 
the grounds that the sei/ure exceeded the 
scope of the warrant and that the plain 
Mew doctrine was not applicable The trial 
judge seems to h iv * igrc« d but denied the 
motion based on the St IU s aigument 
^^y^^^^ *&$**& iiiarOffie^r^Oesb-
•pon, whHr fawfttlhr in the defendant's 
Home, initiated an independent in?* stiga 
jfcion which"provided the officer with proba 
Me-^ i f t J f t seize t h ^ ¥ C ^ a ^ <«gHB^I> 
IWM^^&trir m ide the same argument 
during the defendant's tnal, and the de-
fendant was found guilty of theft b> r e 
ceiving 
II 
At the outset, it is important to note that 
this Court will not disturb the ruling of the 
tral c urt on questions of idrnissibility of 
e> i ^ • unless it cl< trlv appears that the 
lT C A Wl § 76-6 40S (S i?p 19&S) 
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ate AS 712 PJd 207 (Utah 1985) 
lower court was in error.2 Accordingly, amendment is essentially a proscription 
this Court may affirm the trial court's deci-
sion to admit evidence on any proper 
grounds, even though the trial court as-
signed another reason for its ruling.3 
Therefore, we must address whether the 
VCR was seized within the scope of the 
warrant and, if not, whether its seizure 
was justified by an exception to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requ'rement 
HL-The foiiltb amendment protects peo-
v person, jwrafc papery ggd 
••BHHSai^iS^^ proscriptions 
apply with equal force to the states.5 A 
search of a constitutionally protected area, 
as was the case here,* pursuant to a valid 
search warrant, and seizures pursuant 
thereto, are prima facie reasonable. 
At the hearing on the motion to sup-
press, the defendant appears to have con-
ceded that since the officers entered the 
premises pursuant to a search warrant 
there was a valid entry and search.7 
Therefore, the only issue in this case is 
whether the seizure of the tapes and the 
VCR was justified under the fourth amend-
ment. 
[2,3] The State first argues that the 
property seized was within the scope of the 
warrant. The fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires that 
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, s^W£ ri££^fa| |£tfjfe^ affirma-
tion, andjt^K///KKP&&Tfo*&fc the . . . 
things to Be seized." This portion of the 
2. State v. Cole, Ulah, 674 P.2d 119, 122 {\9%l). 
3. See State v. Bryan, Utah. 709 P.2d 257, 260 
(1985). 
4. Sec U.S. Const, amend IV. 
5. State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d i, 5. 432 P.2d 64. 66 
(1967). 
6. See Katz v. United States, 3^* U.S. 347. 351 n. 
8. 356. 88 S.Ct. 507. 511 n. S, 514, 19 L.Fd 2d 5 7 ^ 
(1967); State v. Folkes, Utah. 565 V 2d 1125. 
1127, cert, denied. 434 VS Q71 $* S O ' ? \ 54 
!..Ed.2d 461 (1977). 
against general warrants whereby adminis-
trative officers determine what is and what 
is not to be seized. The decision to seize 
must be judicial, as opposed to adrmwsW 
Jive, and the warrant must be sufficiently 
particular to guide the officer to the thing 
intended to be seized, thereby minimizing^ 
the danger of unwarranted invasion uf jri-
vacy** Accordingly, the Tine between what 
is and what is not sufficiently particular 
must be drawn with a view to accomplish-
ment of the constitutional purpose9 and 
necessarily varies with the circumstances 
and with the nature of the property to be 
seized.10 
[4, 5] In this case, the warrant ordered 
seizure of "all controlled substances and 
stolen property." ^Without substantia* ja» 
tification, warrantS*" **ttescriWng VropertV 
< ory in generic terms (terms applicable to 
*a entire classjjfjjWJpwty) arc" not favored 
by* th? Taw.t1 However, use of such de-
scriptions has been allowed when a more 
specific description of the things to be 
seized is unavailable. Thus, general de-
scriptions have been held .sufficient 
[i]n cases involving contraband, such as 
drugs. . . . [i]n cases where the inherent 
nature of the property sought by a war-
rant precludes specific description.... 
[in rases] where attendant circumstances 
prevented a detailed description from be-
ing given. . . . and [in cases where a] 
detailed description has been difficult 




See Massachusetts v. Shippard, 
104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 
7. Because of counsel's conccsvnr \» 
address the gcx*d faith exception tc 
- ':• J not 
8. State v. Tidyman, 30 Or.App. 537, 568 P.2d 
666, 670 (1977) {citing Marron v. United States, 
275 U.S. 192. 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Rd. 231 
(1927)). 
9. See. e.g., United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 
733 (5th Cir.1981). 
10. See People v. Harmon. 90 l!I.App.3d 753. 755, 
4^ HI.Dec. 27, 29, 413 N f-.2d 467, 469 (1980). 
N\t- ulso State v. Tnv.nsend, 394 F.Supp. 736, 
74<V47 (f. D.Mich.1975). 
11. See Cttok. 6s7 F.2d at 733 
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len goods sought are likely to be part of 
a larger collection of similar contraband 
located at the premises to be searched11 
?re£ogiuze<l except 
the order reqt 
_. "1t!s ob\> 
fr^ti«^ffWsrfiN»#W^^:ularly 
s abridged in this email* 
[6] It has been held thanrgraeifal de-
scription on the face of a warrant may be 
cured by proper incorporation of a suffi-
ciently descriptive supporting affidavit11 
Assuming, without deciding, that the affi-
davit by Officer Eagan was properly incor-
porated and thus validated the general de-
scription on the warrant the seizure of the 
VCR and the tapes was still not within the 
scope of the warrant; the affidavit lists 
only "lawn chairs, electrical wiring, chil-
dren's swing, etc."-as being stolen proper-
ty. 
III. 
17] The State alternatively argues that 
the tapes and the VCR were properly 
sefc' d pursuant to the plain view doctrine. 
Ordinarily, only items described in a search 
'
 ,rant may be seized.15 However, when, 
r. t l e cour*e of performing a lawful search 
f<<r items li-ted on a warrant, officers come 
across other articles of an incriminatory 
hV'»r-. 'hat property may be prpj-erly 
1 nder th« 
l i proposition that wt 
j^tn \ ^ v t h ^ ^ p g g i i S a r t } am* ndrnent 
^rdmgly, in actuality the doe-
!2. Samen v. Suit, Alalia App.. 665 P 2d <57. 
*6J-',2 ( P ? 3 ) (n.-»in<»tr* or.. Med). 
13. S c Xjrr.en. ^ 5 P 2 J at <*2-A?. k':Kry \ 
Sun: (HI Crim . t-02 V2d 240. 242 (197^). 2 W. 
!-i lave. Search and St : ^ r e § 4.6(c). at 102 
(!97«). See also lx>Jt Sales. Inc. v. AV* York, 
442 U S 319. °<> SCt. 2319. 60 LXd 2d 920 
(1979). 
14. See 2 W U Fuvc. S ^ - v h and Sci.-ore 
§ 4 * \ i ) . a: K>0 n. 23 (ic?< L v . r p m*). 
13. S--e St~:e i Cnj/in. I uh. <2c T 2d 47*. 4<2 
(19M) (Wdtmv J c :.. : -> ' ) . 
trine merely provides grounds for seizure 
of an item when access to an object is 
properly justified under the fourth amend-
ment The owner's only remaining inter* 
ests are those of possession and owner-
ship.11 
[SJ Because this Court is sensitive to 
the inherent danger that officers will use 
the plain view doctrine to enlarge specific 
authorization to seize into a general war-
rant to rummage, we have previously 
adopted a^aodified wrston of tilt guide-
lffffi laJTifowB in Coolidgc p. New Hamfh 
skirt*** J&usr V" warrantless seizure of 
property in plain view after a lawful intru-
sion is justified if: "(1) the officer j f BStfSI 
l|W 'pllSJtll^ Where the search anaseizure 
occur;" ff^ evidence is^Hrpltitt Vfew; and 
(3) the evidence is clanrij incriminating,;, * 
There is no questioJf^at^ffie'XOT? and 
tapes were in plain view and, a- »•<-.• ed 
above, the defendant conceded tha» : « of-
ficers were lawfully present. The •»• r» »d 
ant, however, argues that the incrim*i;a;ur> 
nature of the property was not "immediate-
ly apparent" This language from Cool-
idgc is in substance contained in the third 
requirement noted abo\e tlat the evidence 
be "cliarly incri;ni^iating.M^fhr^l«rtJ^|-
cjjiiiiiiiitingi^ii!qiwrcwictit' also mJaJ^Ies 
*ktt officers have probable eause to associ-
ate thcjyQI*^^ 
iKlivitx 
{9J The .-cope of this r< juirernent must 
be determined by balancing the intrusion 
on fourth arrundm* nt interests against the 
pn>n -?ti.>n of legitimate >» .ernmental in 
16. &r c V 
(1053). 
v. Romero, 660 P 2d 715, ; i « 
17. S*-e State \ Martinez, 2} I'lah 2d 62. 6^ V 
457 T2d 613. 615 n. 5 (1969). 
IS. See TeiJU v. frown, 460 V.S 730. 7 .^ 103 
SCt. ! r ™ . 1541. 7< I I'd 2d 502 (l' 'S3). 
19. 403 I S 443, 91 SCt 2)22. 29 I Id 2d **4 
U^71). 
20K 5 s:e \ £.<•:, >o I !uh. 6^» 1* 2d .«' 71 h (' *.t 
- \- * J). 
STATE v 
CUe ** 712 PJid 
terests.21 The State of course has a valid 
interest in gathering and seizing evidence 
of criminal activity in order to suppress the 
lawless element of our society. However, 
iW-pubik1 iiad- ih* right t& be fret from 
unreasonable seizures by the SUte^ A1 
f$i0tfp***f#«^ the 
"clearly incriminating" requirement as re-
quiring that evidence be "clearly incrimina-
ting" at first glance,22 to allow police to 
conduct an off-premises investigation to es-
tablish probable cause to seize property not 
designated in the search warrant is clearly 
unacceptable under the fourth amendment. 
Here, Officer Geslison testified that at 
the time he first saw the VCR he had no 
information that the video recorder had 
been stolen. The record indicates that Of-
ficer Geslison only had reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that the recorder was stolen 
after having a dispatcher follow up the 
defendant's claim that he rented the ma-
chine from Norton's. At trial. Officer 
Mock testified that the inquiry through the 
police dispatcher took from ten to fifteen 
minutes. Officer Geslison's subsequent 
discovery of the missing identification num-
ber and discovery the next day that the 
property was in fact stolen, did not dissi-
pate thlFWBW|^^Byi Affirmance of this 
type of police'investigation would have the 
proscribed effect of allowing police to 
search under a general warrant. 
based upon 8 search warrant and Vhtie 
there initiate and conclude an indepci«kat 
outside investigation lo achieve probable 
cause to seize unnamed property*%*?Xj£?'t£ 
partrcuTafT>^true in a* case *"'strdr4ttr this 
when nothing about the nature or physical 
character of the property seized rendered it 
inherently identifiable as being stolen. 
. KNOLL 
211 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 2 1 1 
jppress 
Id the case is remanded for a new 
trial. 
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM ana ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
21. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 L'.S MS 6M OQ 
S.Ct. 1391, 13%. 59 L.Ed Id ttO (1979). 
STATE of Utah,, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Paul Leo KNOLL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18857. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 3, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant C. 
Croft. J., of manslaughter, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) self-defense instruction was prop-
er, and (2) evidence was sufficient to sup-
port finding that defendant had not acted 
in self-defense. 
Affirmed. 
1. Homicide <£=37 
Absence of self-defens*- is not cue of 
the prima facie elements of homicide. U.C. 
A.1953, 76-2-401, 76-2-402, 76-5-201. 76-
5-205. 
2. Homicide 0 2 1 K 3 ) 
Although self-defense is a defense in 
fiomicide prosecution, procedural rules that 
govern its pleading and proof are largely 
influenced by constitutional requirements 
"that State must prove criminal act beyond 
a reasonable doubt. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-402. 
3. Homicide <s=>244(3) 
Defendant is not required to establish 
defense of self-defense beyond a reason-
able doubt, or even by preponderance of 
the evidence; thus, jury may acquit even 
thoy^h evidence of self-defense fell far 
sh>rt of establishing justification or excuse 
b\ a preponderance of the evidence upon 
t:.e subject. U.C.A 1953, 7(>-2-4u2. 
22. S<e Texas v. Bmwn. 4<s0 I S at 74!, 103 
S.Ct. at 1542. 
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[5] Even if her constitutional rights 
were not violated, Brisebois contends that 
she was prejudiced by the mid-trial amend-
ment. CrR 2.1(d) states: 
The court may permit any information 
to be amended at any time before verdict 
or finding if substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. 
The defendant bears the burden of showing 
prejudice. State v. Jones, 26 Wash.App. 1, 
6, 612 P.2d 404 (1980); State v. Eaton, 24 
Wash.App. 143, 600 P.2d 632 (1979). 
[6,7] In evaluating prejudice, the court 
must determine if the defendant was mis-
led or surprised. State v. Brown, 74 
Wash.2d 799, 801, 447 P.2d 82 (1968). 
Here, the trial court determined that nei-
ther was the case. The State provided 
Brisebois with discovery outlining the 
State's witnesses' testimony. Much of this 
material involved Brisebois' actions prior to 
September 1979. The amended informa-
tion did not require Brisebois to defend 
against any additional allegations. Nor 
was Brisebois required to rebut additional 
testimony. The trial court ruled correctly. 
Finally, Brisebois argues that the statute 
of limitations barred prosecution for all 
conduct occurring before November 1979. 
The statute of limitations for theft is 3 
years. RCW 9A.04.080. Brisebois argues 
that if the State was properly limited to 
proving those acts that fell within the stat-
ute of limitations period, the State would 
not be able to prove Brisebois took more 
than $1,500. 
[S-10] Neither statute nor case law 
supports this contention. RCW 9A.56.-
010(12)(c) provides: 
Whenever any series of transactions 
which constitute theft, would, when con-
sidered separately, constitute theft in the 
third degree because of value, and said 
series of transactions are a part of a 
common scheme or plan, then the trans-
actions may be aggregated in one count 
Whether successive takings constitute a 
single larceny is a question of fact for the 
jury. State v. Vining, 2 Wash.App. 802, 
S09, 472 P.2d 564, 53 A.L R.3d 390 (1970). 
Brisebois neither argued at trial nor main-
tains on appeal that her crime was not 
continuous. "[When a] crime is continu-
ous^] [t]he crime is not completed until the 
continuing criminal impulse [is] terminat-
ed." State v. Carner, 36 Wash.App. 755, 
758, 677 P.2d 768 (1984). The statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the 
crime is completed. State v. Carrier, su-
pra. Here, the crime was completed in 
1980, well within the 3-year statute of limi-
tations. 
The judgment and sentence is affirmed. 
SCHOLFIELD and WARD WILLIAMS, 
J J., concur. 
/?v~ ^ 
39 Wash.App. 136 
STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Lisa L. DRESKER (Lindquist) and 
Richard Lindquist, Appellants. 
No. 5716^111-0. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3. 
Dec. 11, 19S4. 
Defendants were convicted in the Su-
perior Court, Grant County, James D. Ken-
dall, J., of manufacturing controlled sub-
stance, and they appealed. The Coun of 
Appeals, Thompson, J., held that officers' 
entry into defendants' residence wFV^it 
a#esl eff iea;^ 
e^tiiiiiiiw "^HBBtg 
Reversed. 
1. Arrest ^68.5(4) 
In absence of consent or exigent cir-
cumstances, arrest warrant is required to 
STATE v. DRKSKKR Wash. 847 
Cite as 692 P.2d 546 (Wash.App. 19S4) 
enter suspect's home to make criminal ar- \\ her^&^ficerS-iiaji,no more than suspicion 
rest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 
2. Searches and Seizures <S=>7(29) 
State has burden of establishing that 
consent to search was in fact freely and 
voluntarily given. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
4. 
3. Searches and Seizures <3^7(27) 
wt*ijjT JJaQiJli. j)jijjI'Mjii jift ijhfrnHqrt' s 
^BCWA'10.31.100. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law £^1139 
While findings of trial court following 
suppression hearing were of great signifi-
cance, constitutional rights at issue in de-
fendant's claim of illegal search and sei-
zure required Court of Appeals to make 
independent evaluation of evidence. 
5. Searches and Seizures €--3.3(1) 
Mere possibility d 
cientjggg^ 
fleeing ,^ y&gfi6^dii2M^«<*¥ -^-^ dditional rele-
vm^fmm^W^f^^^deredy includ-
ing gravity of offense committed, belief 
that suspect is armed, and likelihood that 
suspect would escape in absence of swift 
police action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
6. Arrest <^68.5(4) 
vt**}jm*mm 'iWJW^iagatf'mcr^ belief 
thaU 
li§R&v#d. 
7. Arrest e==63.4(3) 
posel 
8. Arrest £>68.5(4) 
O f f i c e r s J ^ ^ f ^ ^ g ^ ^ o ent^r defend-
ant's r f f l ^ ^ ^ 
r: 
Harry E. Ries, Ries & Kenison, Moses 
Lake, for appellants. 
Paul A. Klasen, Jr., Pros. Atty., Mary 
Ann Brady, Deputy Pros. Atty., Ephrata, 
for respondent. 
THOMPSON, Judge. 
Richard Lindquist and Lisa Dresker 
Lindquist were convicted under the lTni-
form Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.-
50, of manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance. On appeal they contend the trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress evi-
dence seized at their residence. We re-
verse. 
This case arose out of a prenuptial wed-
ding reception held in honor of the Lind-
quists' forthcoming June wedding. Ser-
geant Cleve Schuchman of the Grant Coun-
ty sheriffs office received a radio message 
that a large party was taking place at the 
Lindquist mobile home located approxi-
mately a mile outside the city of Quincy. 
Sergeant Schuchman arrived at the Lind-
quist residence about 9:30 p.m. the evening 
of May 22, 1382, and observed 40 to 50 
vehicles parked in the area. He testified 
he associated some of the vehicles with 
minors. The party was loud and he saw 
people wandering about the premises with 
beer bottles and drinking cups in their 
hands. 
Sergeant Schuchman returned to the 
Quincy Police Department and organhed 
additional police officers for the pur-
pose of conducting a raid. As Sergeant 
Schuchman testified at the suppressions 
hearing, "I felt at that point we had proba-
ble cause to go into the residence to check, 
to see if in fact they were drinking". In^ 
organizing the raid, the officers, anticipat-
ing that their arrival would precipitate the 
rapid departure of some partygoers, devel-
oped a plan of containment whereby some 
deputies were directed to go directly into 
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the Lindquist residence and others were to 
go directly to the garage area. Sergeant 
Schuchrnan elected to remain on the road 
near the residence. 
The seven police officers arrived at the 
residence and proceeded directly to their 
assigned tasks. Deputy Schultz stated 
that as he approached the front door of the 
mobile home he could see through the front 
window what appeared to be minors in the 
residence with beer bottles and paper cups 
in their hands. At or near the front door, 
Deputy Schultz testified he met Richard 
Lindquist and the deputy stated, "let's step 
inside the residence." Mr. Lindquist made 
no reply and the deputy continued on into 
the home. 
After entering the mobile home, the dep-
uties segregated the people, directing the 
adults to remain in the mobile home and 
directing persons under 21 out into the 
garage. Some of the deputies then pro-
ceeded to write citations to the adults re-
maining in the dining room area while oth-
er deputies wandered about the home look-
ing in rooms and closets for additional sus-
pects. Some 15 to 30 minutes after their 
arrival, Deputy Schultz noticed a tray on 
top of a buffet in the dining room area. 
The tray^ conj^ed---4fiaij^fiA^3geds and, 
ties returned to town for a search warrant 
while others remained to secure the resi-
dence. A search warrant was obtained and 
served upon the Lindquists and a subse-
quent search and seizure produced addi-
tional contraband and drug paraphernalia, 
most of which was entered into evidence 
during trial. After a 2-day hearing on de-
fendants' motion to suppress during which 
witnesses testified for both the prosecution 
and the defendants, the trial court denied 
the motion. 
1. We have not addressed the propriety of the 
issuance of the search warrant based on Deputy 
Schultz' affidavit nor the scope and intensity of 
the subsequent search since no such issues have 
[1] T ^ ^ 
had a right to be, Slate v. Chrisrnan, 100 
Wash.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984), then 
adopting Pay!on v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 629 (1980); 
State v. Teuher, 19 Wash.App. 651, 577 
P.2d 147 (1978) (misdemeanor arrest). The 
force of this rule is underlined in the Pay-
ton decision. That court held the Fourth 
Amendment 
protects the individual's privacy in a vari-
ety of settings. In none is the zone of 
privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical 
dimensions of an individual's home—a 
zone that finds its roots in clear and 
specific constitutional terms: 'The right 
of the people to be secure in their . . . 
houses . .. shall not be violated/' . . . 
deputies formulated a plan while still at the 
Quincy police station whereby the resi-
dence would be entered in order to mini-
mize the anticipated rapid departure of par-
tygoers that would be precipitated by the 
been raised on appeal. Our silence should not 
be interpreted as either approval or disapproval 
of the procedures. 
STATE v. DRESKER 
CUc as *92 P.2d $46 (Wash.*pp. 13S4) 
Wash. 849 
arrival of the police. Deputy Schultz was 
on his way into the Lindquist residence 
when by happenstance he ran into Mr. 
Lindquist. In light of the deputies' previ-
ously planned destination, it is obvious his 
statement to Mr. Lindquist, "$ 
m SI 
entef^TcTThe contrary, it was~a "command 
to Mr. Lindquist to go back into the resi-
dence. Mr. Lindquist's silence and compli-
ance with the command was not consent; 
consent was neither sought nor given. 
[4-6] In Counts, 99 Wash, at 60, 659 
es which could Be termed exigent: (iW*^ 
determined the State established exigent 
circumstances warranting entry into the 
residence in order to prevent mass disper-
sal. We disagree. While the findings of 
the trial court following a suppression 
hearing are of great significance to a re-
viewing court, the constitutional rights at 
issue require us to make an independent 
evaluation of the evidence. State v. 
Daugherty, 94 Wash.2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d 
649 (1980); State v. Agee, 89 Wash.2d 416, 
419, 573 P.2d 355 (1977). The mere possi-
bility of escape is not sufficient under the 
fleeing suspect exigency. State v. Coyle, 
A police officer having probable cause 
to believe that a person has committed or 
is committing a felony shall have the 
authority to arrest the person without a 
warrant. A police-officer mav urrest a 
person^wiiM&iJ^raht iorxQ.rrunittiner 
a mm0&w&W)T,.*M\, rf*u»w wijwqtttfeftfter 
p i e ^ ^ i ^ ^ were 
•of-rreeded to enter the Lindquist residence 
ince misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors 
;sc-re being committed in the presence of 
„ „ _ _ _ . _ . fTfc^Fdo 
tfWfsupport the State's contention. Ser-
geant Sehuehman. at the suppression hear-
ing, indicated he had no more than a suspi-
cion a misdemeanor was being committed. 
He stated, after initially observing the vehi-
cles and suspects at the residence, "I felt 
at that point we had probable cause to go 
into the residence to check to see if in fact 
they were drinking." (Italics ours.) If 
minors were not drinking, no crime was 
being committed. Additionally, it should 
be noted that no one testified at the sup-
pression hearing who the suspect minors 
were or who owned the suspect cars. 
Without articulating specific facts pertain-
ing to a specific person who is committing 
r, 1 ^ ^ ^ f ^ a r S t g e r n i 6 r & a misdemeanor, 
V rv !" llmnriiMl il" j'ULL ?'. Ellison, Additional relevant factors should be con-
sidered, including (1) the gravity of the^ 
offense committed; (2) the belief that the 
suspect is armed; and (3) the likelihood 
that the suspect would escape in the ab-
sence of swift police action. United States 
v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 934, 100 S.Ct. 
1328, 63 I,Ed.2d 770 (1980). Here, the 
originally contemplated offenses were rela-
tively minor liquor violations with no indi-
cation weapons would be present. The 
record does not support exigent circum-
stances sufficient to warrant entry of the 
Lindquist home without a warrant. 
[7,8] RCW 10.31.100 provides in perti-
nent part: 
r a s n . ^ n r r r r r r ; 467 P.2d S39 (1970). 
We conclude the officers' entry into the 
Lindquist residence without an arrest or 
search warrant was unlawful. Since they 
were not in a place they had a right to be, 
all evidence seized as a result of their un-
lawful entry must be suppressed. As not-
ed by the trial judge, the incidence of un-
derage drinking is a source of grave con-
cern for society and police action geared 
toward cj^ta^ng this activity is warranted; 
nut 1$jfriri^r\g™Tffi 
itHht a nnnr IHMH 
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Defendants' motion to suppress should 
have been granted. Reversed. 
FARIS, J. Pro Tern., and McINTURFF, 
J., concur. 
39 Wash.App. 130 
STATE of Washington, Appellant, 
v. 
Raymond J. OWENS, Respondent. 
No. 606S-III-3. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3, Panel One. 
Dec. 11, 1984. 
Review Denied Feb. 15, 1085. 
The State appealed from order of the 
Superior Court, Kittitas County, W R. Cole. 
J., suppressing testimony of police officer 
and his passenger regarding defendant's 
flight from illegal traffic stop. The Court 
of Appeals, Mclnturff, J., held that police 
officer and his passenger could testify re-
garding defendant's flight from illegal traf-
fic stop, and it was for trier of fact to 
determine whether defendant's actions of 
accelerating car and racing through town 
at speeds of fifty miles per hour and 
through five stop signs were normal and 
reasonable reactions to illegal stop. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Arrest e^68(4) 
"Seizure" within meaning of Fourth 
Amendment occurs when a reasonable per-
son believes he is not free to leave. U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
1. RCW 46.16.010 provides in part: 
2. Arrest e=>63(4) 
In case of automobiles, "seizure" oc-
curs when police officer switches on his 
flashing light. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law <s=351(3), 737(1) 
Police officer and his passenger could 
testify regarding defendant's flight from 
illegal traffic stop, and it was for trier of 
fact to determine whether defendant's ac-
tions of accelerating car and racing 
through town at speeds of fifty miles per 
hour and through five stop >\gns were nor-
mal and reasonable reactions to illegal 
stop. West's RCWA 46.61.024; U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law ^304(1) 
Judicial notice would be taken of fact 
that the fifty mile per hour race through 
town with disregard for five .-.top signs is 
not normal and reasonable relation to ille-
gal stop, but shows complete wanton and 
wilful disregard for life and property of 
others. 
Joseph Panattoni, Prosecuting Atty., El-
lensburg, for appellant. 
Chelsea C. Korte, Dano, Cone, Fraser & 
Gilreath, Ellensburg, for respondent. 
McINTURFF, Judge. 
The State appeals an order suppressing 
the testimony of a police officer and his 
passenger regarding Mr. Owens' flight 
from an illegal traffic stop. We vacate the 
order and remand for trial. 
Officer Patrick Woodruff of the Roslyn 
police department first ob>cr\ ed a black 
and white Chrysler Imperial v\kh Montana 
license plates in December 1982, and subse-
quently on four other o,-oa>lons in January 
and February 1983. On March 13, 1983, 
although the car was not engaged in any 
other illegal activity, the officer attempted 
to stop the car, suspecting it was being 
operated in violation of the vehicle licens-
ing statute, RCW 46.16.0i0.1 As he ap-
It shall be unlawful for a person to operate 
any 'vehicle over and along a public highway 
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did not. On the other hand, the Perrydale 
school superintendent testified: 
-"[SUPERINTENDENT:] Any change 
you make tax dollar wise, in the Perry-
dale District, it is adversely going to 
affect the children in that district. 
We're presently under a tax rate limita-
tion law that says we cannot just raise 
the tax rate of a district and reapportion 
out the costs. So what I'm saying is, if 
the $2,000 or $3,000 in taxes from the 
Kumley property were removed from the 
Perrydale District, we would not be able 
to recoup that money; that would be a 
loss to our District of that amount. 
* * * * * * 
"CHAIRMAN: If Perrydale is cut 
$4,000, say for round figures, then for 
the sake of argument, what might be 
cut? 
"[SUPERINTENDENT]: Oh, we're 
looking at half of a teacher's aide per-
haps. At this point who knows where 
you begin, textbooks? We're right down 
to bare bones now, we've had our tax 
levy up twice and it's been defeated. 
Hopefully, we're going to be able to pay 
it so we can open in the fall. It could be 
any part of our program." 
The Board found that the proposed change 
would have a substantial adverse affect 
upon the ability of the Perrydale School 
District to provide the educational program 
required by law, that the record contained 
no evidence that the proposed change 
meets the criterion in ORS 330.090(2)(a) 
and that petitioners failed to carry their 
burden to present such evidence. Petition-
ers' assignment of error is without merit.3 
Affirmed. 
3. Because of cur disposition of petitioners' first 
a l ignment of error, it is not necitsary lo dis-
75 Or.App. 292 
STATE of Oregon, Respondent, 
v. 
Vernon Herman ROBERTS, Appellant. 
72256 D.I.; CA A3I830. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted July 15, 1985. 
Decided Sept. 18, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Washington County, Michael J. 
McElligott, J., of driving under influence of 
intoxicants, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Young, J., held that warrantless 
entry into defendant's residence to effect 
arrest was unreasonable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
L Searches and Sei/ures £^3.3(1) 
"Exigent circumstances^.' ..Justifying 
emergency situation requiring 'swiff"action 
to prevent imminent danger to life or jeii-
evidence. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. A u t o m o b i l e s <^349 
Need to $eoirj^&&^ °f 
driving^uhrfef the m?!^J^^^S ,ggg!cants, 
that 4 y , ^ r i f e 1 ^ 
warrantless entry into hor^Itsiat^pT^res 
that arresting officers coula^jiot^have ob-
tained' w a r nint -beforr^df^fftl'-Ul'i ~ cfrf en d-
anfs'Body dissipated. 
3. Searches and Seizures ^3.3(1) 
exfgeiiO*»-iSyl'f&$#%':"t$* 'ffrnffftfrlze them-
selves, with ccnifM^iiI^)gj[ly-^n and a t e d pro-
cedure 
cuss their other al ignments. 
4. Arrest c^6S.5(4) 
Warrantless entry into defendant's res-
idence to effect arrest for driving while 
under influence of intoxicants was unrea-
sonable where, even though officers had 
probable cause to believe that defendant 
had been driving his car while under influ-
ence of intoxicants and to believe that de-
fendant was in his apartment, no exigent 
circumstances excusing failure to obtain 
warrant were presented by officers' lack of 
familiarity with procedure for obtaining 
warrant and resultant delay that obtaining 
warrant would have entailed. Const. Art. 
1, § 9. 
Steven L. Price, Hillsboro, argued the 
cause and filed the brief for appellant. 
Xim Y. "¥ie\V>, K^X. kY\>\ \^T>., ^ e m , 
argued the cause for respondent. With her 
on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. 
Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. 
Gen., Salem. 
Before GILLETTE, P.J., JOSEPH, C.J., 
and YOUNG, J. 
YOUNCLJudere. 
ueiendant appeals nis conviction for 
driving while under the influence of intoxi-
cants (DUII). ORS 487.540. He argues 
that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a 
result of a warrantless entry into his resi* 
dence. We agreear 
Sunday, September 30, 19847 at approxi-
mately 2:30 p.m. Deputies Bass and Kayfes 
received a radio dispatch to check for a 
dr\it\k driver irv a browtv Puvto, Ikewse l^aXe 
JTW 806. The deputies found the vehicle 
off the road behind a guard rail. Kayfes 
searched the unlocked car and through Mo-
tor Vehicle Division records determined 
that defendant was the last known owner 
of the vehicle and that he lived at a particu-
lar address on SW Franklin Street. Bass 
was told by a service station attendant that 
a drunken man had recently walkea into 
the station, indicated that his car was off 
the road and used the telephone to call a 
taxi. The taxi company reported that a 
STATE v. ROBERTS Or. 565 
C!le as 706 P.2d 5^4 (Or.App. 1985) 
driver had picked up a passenger at the 
station at 2:33 p.m. and had dropped him 
off at the Franklin Street address. 
The deputies arrived at the Franklin 
Street address at 2:58 p.m. They knocked 
on the door and rang the door bell with no 
response. The police dispatcher called de-
fendant's phone number. The deputies 
heard the phone ring, and then it stopped 
ringing. The dispatcher verified that the 
phone had been picked up and immediately 
hung up. The deputies consulted with 
their sergeant, who advised them to enter 
the home to check on defendant's condition. 
They entered the unlocked apartment and 
announced their presence. They went up-
stairs to the bedroom and found defendant 
in bed. Kayfes asked defendant if he was 
all right and if he owned the Thrown Pinto. 
Defendant responded yes to both ques-
tions. He was then advised of his Mi-
randa rights and arrested. He took a 
breath test which registered a .23 percent 
blood alcohol content. He admitted that he 
was drunk. 
Defendant filed a_ 
press "all gyffif}^&n 
n^TVp*nt ?.pfpTid"t oh*>t'nerl as a result of 
thai tiir warratm 
staw^sffiaaa 
roaounablo jieayefags^ 
IV, XIV. The motion was denied. 
In order to justify a warrantless entry of 
a residence to effectuate an arrest, the 
state must demonstrate bottor-^rttbabli 
^^kmA^^g^^iyton v.'Xtw York, 
445 t^r^ffSToSO, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); State v. Rubert, 46 
Or.App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). The offi-
cers had probable cause to believe that 
defendant was driving his car while under 
the influence of intoxicants and probable 
cause to believe that defendant was in the 
apartment. The critical issue is whether 
the state carried its burden to prove that 
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there were exigent circumstances excusing 
the failure to obtain a w-arrant. 
[1] "Exigent circumstances" involve an 
emergency situation requiring swift action 
to prevent imminent danger to life or seri-
ous damage to property or to forestall the 
imminent escape of a subject or the de-
struction of evidence. State v. Girard, 276 
Or. 511, 514 n. 2, 555 P.2d 445 0976); State 
v. Parras, 43 Or.App. 373, 376, 602 P.2d 
1125 (1979), rev. den. 288 Or. 335 (1980). 
The state argues that the officers' concern 
for defendant's health and the need to test 
for blood alcohol content before the alcohol 
naturally dissipated justified proceeding 
without a warrant. We agree with the 
Defendant cites Welsh v. Wisconsin, — 
U.S. — , 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 
(1984), for the proposition that, u^ff irAq 
the facts in this case. The distinction is the 
seriousness of the crime. The Supreme 
Court explained: 
"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to 
classify the first offense for driving 
while intoxicated as a non-criminal civil 
forfeiture offense for which no imprison-
ment is possible. * * * Given this ex-
pression of the state's ^ ^ ^ s i g J U ^ f * 
simply because evi3?fjce o|T^jJ|Tttfori-
pated vniie'^tne-^efe^^toim^n't.^w^gv 
2100, 80 L.Ed.2d at 746 (citations omit-
ted). 
Oregon law treats drunk driving as a seri-
ous criminal offense. DUII is a Class A 
misdemeanor. ORS 487.540(3). A first^of-
fender may be imprisoned for up to one 
year. ORS 161 615(1). The United States 
!. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
the trial court meant to take judicial notice of 
the time necessary to obtain a warrant, but that 
Supreme Court's holding in Welsh is inap-
posite. 
[2] Because of the peculiar nature of 
the DUII offense, defendant's personal 
condition and, therefore, his person are evi-
dence. In some circumstances, the need to 
secure that evidence of the crime of DUII 
—defendant's body—might justify a war-
rantless entry of a home, if the state 
proves that the arresting officers could 
not have obtained a warrant before the 
alcohol in the suspect's body dissipated. 
We turn to the evidence on that question. 
[3] The evidence offered by the state in 
this case consisted of the officers' testimo-
ny that obtaining a warrant would have 
taken an entire day, because the officers 
had no familiarity with the procedure. Po-
lice officers cannot create their own exigen-
cies by failing to familiarize themselves 
with constitutionally mandated procedures. 
The court found that the state's evidence 
as to exigency was in 'somewhat of a 
peculiar mode," because the testifying offi-
cer did not really know how long it would 
take to get a warrant. The court then 
made the following factual findings: 
"I do have some experience in those 
sorts of situations and so I kind of in 
effect know from my own experience as 
opposed to the evidence that it wouldn't 
take a day but it would take two to three 
hours and then the location of a judge 
and the securing of the warrant would 
take—some of that can go on during the 
same time but you have to deliver the 
papers, he has to sign them, etc. So 
you're talking something in the area of 
three to four hours, assuming one of the 
judges was available at that time * * * 
and you'd be in the area of six or seven 
hours from the time of arriving to the 
arrest * * * and I know that an ,08 will 
dissipate from a person's body in some-
thing like four hours * * *." 
The court's factual findings are not sup-
ported by any evidence in the record.1 We 
also note that the court did not consider the 
would not have been a proper subject for judi-
cial notice in any event. Scv OEC 201(b). 
iAYNES v. \YFA 
CM. as 706 P.2^ = 
l 5 » H ^ t l « ^ 
133.545(4); 133.555(3), a procedure which i£ 
available when a personal application 
would interfere with the ability of the po-
lice to conduct a timely search. State V-
Jordan, 73 Or.App. 84, 88 n. 2, 697 P.2d 
1004 (1985). 
a n y a i i f t t f e 
ERYLVSTBET* CO. Or. 567 
67 (Or.App. 1985) 
dispute between claimant and self-insured 
employer over appropriate amount of pay-
ment of doctor's fee for services in connec-
tion with an accepted claim. The Court of 
Appeals, Young, J., held that Board lacked 
jurisdiction, since under statute, a dispute 
concerning amount of fee to which medical 
service provider is entitled for providing 
medical services to compensibly injured 
workers is excluded from jurisdiction of 
Hearings D: Ision and Board. 
Affirmed. 
_rartS47, 
612 P.2d 771. 
\A\ The ^tate failed to c?oc\:\ \te busdett 
to prove exigency. We,h^il^kU^.^UlxX 
..JStft*! . _ „ _ _ ,. ._.._„_,... 
ti 
.., fcrftrTrte of ml 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial-
Co | < t f »ai<BlRSYSUMj 
Workers' Com pen sal ion C--1086 
Pursuant to ORS 656.704(3), a dispute 
concerning amount of fee to which medical 
service provider is entitled for providing 
medical services to compensibly injured 
workers is excluded from jurisdiction of 
Hearings Division. Therefore, the Work-
ers' Compensation Board lacked jurisdic-
tion to review dispute between claimant 
and self-insured employer over appropriate 
amount of payment of doctor's fee for ser-
vices in connection with an accepted claim. 
ORS 656 2S3(1). 
75 Or.App. 262 
In the Matter of the Compensation of 
Charles S. Haynes, Claimant. 
Charles S. HAYNES, Petitioner, 
v. 
WEYERHAEUSER CO., Respondent. 
81-09765; CA A33306. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted March 1, 1985. 
Decided Sept. 18, 1985. 
Reconsideration Denied Nov. 1, 1985. 
Review Denied Nov. 26, 1985. 
Claimant petitioned for review of deci-
sion of Workers' Compensation Bakrd in 
2. The stale also argues thai the warrantless en-
try was justified, because defendant had "little 
subjective expectation of privacy in his hom£ 
and that defendant "consented" to the entry by 
James L. Edmunson, Eugene, argued the 
cause for petitioner. With him on brief 
were Evohl F. Ma'agon, and Malagon & 
Associates, Eugene. 
J.P. Graff, Portland, argued the cause 
for respondent. With him on brief were 
Schwabe, Williamson, Wyatt, Moore & Rob-
erts, Portland. 
Before GILLETTE, P.J., and VAN 
HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ. 
YOUNG, Judge. 
The issue in this workers' compensation 
case is whether, in light of the provisions 
of ORS 656.283(1), the Workers' Compensa-
tion Board has jurisdiction to review a dis-
not telling the officers to leave when they en-
tered his bedroom. The arguments are without 
merit. 
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otherwise provided in this act and except 
that the obligations of good faith, dili-
gence, reasonableness and care prescr-
ibed by this act may not be disclaimed 
by agreement but the parties may be 
[sic] agreement determine the standards 
by which the performance of such obli-
gations is to be measured of [sic] such 
standards are not manifestly unreason-
able. 
14. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); supra notes 2-3. 
15. Cf. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security 
Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 218, 341 P.2d 944, 946 (1959) 
(bank's agreement with insured caused latter to 
assume bank would fulfill its obligations thereu-
nder). 
16.756 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1985). 
17. Id. at 668. 
18. Although the court in W.B. Farms elsewhere 
indicated that drawee banks are generally not liable 
to payees on checks, at least one exception was 
noted in that case, and given our holding concerning 
a bank's duty to act in good faith and exercise 
ordinary care in all their dealings, another exception 
is recognized. 
19. See generally Livingston Indus., Inc. v. Walker 
Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah 
1977); Walker Bank & Trust Co., 9 Utah 2d at 217-
18, 341 P.2d at 945-46. Cf. Wasatch Bank v. 
Surety Ins. Co. of Cal., 703 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 
1985) ("Whether a third party is a beneficiary of a 
contract is determined by the intent of the parties to 
the contract as evidenced by the contract itself and 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. * (Footnote 
omitted.)). 
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
21. See Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc., 231 Pa. 
Super, at 183-84, 331 A.2d at 844-45. 
22. See id. at 184,332 A.2d at 844-45. 
23. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 9 Utah 2d at 218, 
341P.2dat946. 
24. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text; see 
also Utah Code Ann. 70A-1-203 (1980) 
("Every contract or duty within this act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enf-
orcement."). 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring in the 
Result) 
I agree that this case should be remanded to the 
trial court because there were adequate allegations in 
the complaints to warrant further proceedings, under 
either tort or contract rubric, that could lead to the 
recovery of the damages spelled out in section 70A-
4-103 of the Commercial Code. See Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-4-103 (1981); U.C.C. §4-103 
(1978). However, I would make it clear that the 
question of whether the bank failed to act in good 
faith is quite a different issue than whether it failed 
to exercise ordinary care. 
Section 70A-4-103 governs the remedies avail-
able in this case as a result of either a failure to 
exercise ordinary care or actions taken in bad faith. 
Section 70A-4103(5) permits the collection of con-
sequential (but not punitive) damages when "bad 
faith" is shown, but when nothing more is proven 
than a "failure to exercise ordinary care," one may 
recover only "the amount of the item reduced by an 
amount which could not have been realized by the 
use of ordinary care.*1 Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-
103(5) (1981). The concepts of "good faith" and its 
opposite, "bad faith," as well as that of "ordinary 
care/ should not be casually smeared together under 
the rubric of "good faith and ordinary care," as the 
majority appears to do at places in its opinion. This 
sort of casual use of terminology invites conceptual 
misunderstandings by the Bar, trial courts, and 
juries. In articulating the law, we should do so with 
some analytical precision. That is one of our primary 
obligations as an appellate court. See Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring in part, joined by Hall, C.J., Howe, 
A.C.J., and Stewart, J.). 
1. Because the damages'specified in section 70A-4-
103(5) are specially tailored for UCC violations and 
are more limited than what might be available at 
common law, the result of this statutory tailoring of 
damages is to make the contract or tort designation 
of the cause of action rather academic. Cf. Beck v. 
Farmers* Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 
1985) (comparing range of damages available in tort 
and contract). 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U T A H 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Steven Ray JAMES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 870306 
FILED: January 6, 1989 
FIRST DISTRICT 
Honorable VeNoy Chxistoffersen 
ATTORNEYS: 
Robert W. Gutke, Nathan D. Hult, Logan, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
On petition of defendant Steven Ray James, which 
he filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-
26(2)(c) (1982, Supp. 1988), we granted this interlo-
cutory appeal from certain pretrial orders in the 
instant case in which defendant is charged with first 
degree murder. He claims two errors: (1) that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
for a change of venue; and (2) that his right to a fair 
trial will be jeopardized by the use of a prior convi-
ction as an aggravating circumstance to be proved in 
the guilt phase of his trial. 
tin August 26, 1986, defendant reported that his 
infant son, Steven Roy James, was missing from a 
parked car in which he had left him in a store's 
parking lot in Logan, Utah. Extensive news media 
coverage began immediately. Some of this news 
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coverage was in connection with information disse-
minated by the Logan Police Department. Other 
coverage was in connection with efforts to find the 
missing child, spearheaded by a local volunteer 
committee organized for that purpose. Additional 
coverage was of direct contacts by reporters with the 
parents of the infant. 
On October 11, 1986, the remains of an infant, 
later identified as Steven Roy James, were found in 
Cache County, submerged in an area known as the 
Benson Marina, by a group of duck hunters. The 
remains had begun to decompose, and identification 
was made through forensic evidence concerning the 
infant's hair, footprints and handprints, and identi-
fication of the clothing and blanket in which the 
body was wrapped as being similar to clothing and a 
blanket belonging to the baby. The actual cause of 
death was undetermined but listed as a homicide by 
the state medical examiner. There was no objective 
evidence, however, as to the cause of death. 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder, a 
capital offense, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
202(l)(h) (1978, Supp. 1988). The charge alleged that 
he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
Steven Roy James and alleged as an aggravating 
circumstance that defendant had previously been 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person. Discovery disclosed that defe-
ndant was convicted in 1973 in the state of California 
of the crime of false imprisonment, which the pros-
ecution argues is a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person. He allegedly pleaded guilty 
to false imprisonment pursuant to a plea negotiation 
in which a charge of kidnapping was dismissed. 
CHANGE OF VENUE 
Defendant moved for but was denied a change of 
venue. He argues that the extensive pretrial publicity 
and the unique circumstances of widespread comm-
unity involvement in Cache County, a relatively small 
and homogeneous geographical area, to fmd the 
missing child make it extremely difficult for him to 
obtain a fair trial. Thus, he contends the denial of 
his motion was an abuse of discretion. The constit-
utions of Utah and of the United States both guara-
ntee a defendant the right of trial by an impartial 
jury. Utah Const, art. I, §12; U.S. Const, amend. 
VI. This right has been implemented by Utah Code 
Ann. §77-35-29(e)(i) and (ii) (1982, Supp. 1988), 
which provides: 
(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in 
a criminal action believes that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the jur-
isdiction where the action is pending, 
either may, by motion, supported by an 
affidavit setting forth the facts, ask to 
have the trial of the case transferred to 
another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the 
representations made in the affidavit are 
true and justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall enter an order for the 
removal of the case to the court of 
another jurisdiction free from the obje-
ction and all records pertaining to {he 
case shall be transferred forthwith to the 
court in the other county. If the court is 
not satisfied that the representations so 
made justify transfer of the case, the 
court shall either enter an order denying 
the transfer or order a formai hearing in 
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court to resolve the matter and receive 
further evidence with respect to the 
alleged prejudice. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e)®, (ii). 
Although the statute speaks in terms of the trial 
court's being "satisfied" that the representations 
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of 
the case, this Court has apparently never defined the 
term "satisfied." We note that this term has been 
employed in our change of venue statute since at 
least 1888. See 2 Comp. Laws of Utah §4992 (1888). 
In the long line of cases which have come to this 
Court beginning with State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 
480, 50 P. 526 (1897), we have held that it lies within 
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine if 
a change of venue should be granted on the ground 
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the 
county in which the offense has been committed, and 
this Court will not disturb that decision unless an 
abuse of discretion is shown. We have in every case 
which has come to this Court found no abuse of 
discretion in the denial of a change of venue by the 
trial court. Only in State v. BeBec, 110 Utah 484, 
491, 175 P.2d 478, 481 (1946), did we go so far as to 
say that "it certainly would not have been error for 
the court to have granted a change of venue and we 
are of the opinion that it would have been better if 
the trial court had granted the change under the cir-
cumstances ...." The circumstances of that case 
which prompted that strong statement from this 
Court were 
inflammatory newspaper comments; 
suggestive remarks of a church official 
quoted in the paper; the gathering of an 
armed mob; a comparatively small 
community, no doubt closely knit by 
church affiliations; a deceased well 
known to the community, popular, and 
having many friends and relatives thro-
ughout the county; and an obviously 
eccentric old man as an accused whose 
penchant for rhetorical showmanship 
repulses what little tolerance might oth-
erwise have been accorded him. 
BcBcc, 110 Utah at 491, 175 P.2d at 481-82. In 
every other case decided by this Court on this 
subject, we have simply held that the denial of a 
change of venue was not an abuse of discretion and 
that the showing made by the defendant in support 
of his motion was inadequate. But we have never 
defined or attempted to indicate other than our 
expression in State v. BeBcc, quoted above, what 
would be an adequate showing. Even in that case, 
however, we did not hold that the denial was an 
abuse of discretion, although we did state that "it 
would have been better" if the change of venue had 
been granted. 
Although the term "satisfied" is often used in the 
law to mean something akin to a conviction or belief 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in the context of change 
of venue, the term should not be given that meaning. 
In Stare v. BeBee, in dictum we indicated that 
"where there is a probability" that pretrial publicity 
and prejudice will be given undue consideration or 
that bias will creep in because of these factors, it 
would be well for the trial judge to remove the trial 
to a place far enough away where such influence 
would be a negligible factor if present at all. Later, 
in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 88-89 (Utah 1982), 
we stated that the affidavit of defense counsel and a 
newspaper article regarding the victim's father fell 
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far short of demonstrating that there was such a 
tainted community attitude that a fair and impartial 
trial was "not likely." In an attempt to more defini-
tely define the standard to be followed by the trial 
judge in considering a motion for a change of venue, 
we conclude that the judge should grant the motion 
whenever he or she finds a reasonable likelihood that 
a fair trial cannot be had unless the motion is 
granted. This is the rule fashioned by the Supreme 
Court of California in Maine v. Superior Court, 68 
Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968), 
taking its cue from language used in Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966). In a later case, Frazier 
v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 5 
Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971), 
the California court explained that a reasonable lik-
elihood of prejudice does not mean that the prejudice 
must be more probable than not. In summary, alth-
ough section 77-35-29(e)(ii) employs language to 
the effect that the trial court should be "satisfied" 
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the 
jurisdiction where the action is pending, the burden 
on the defendant should be understood to be that he 
must raise a "reasonable likelihood" that such a trial 
cannot be afforded him. 
We now examine the record in an attempt to 
isolate the factors which have been considered crit-
eria of the potential for prejudice from pretrial 
publicity. Factors to be considered include (1) the 
standing of the victim and the accused in the com-
munity; (2) the size of the community; (3) the nature 
and gravity of the offense; and (4) the nature and 
extent of publicity. Martinez v. Superior Court of 
Placer County, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 629 P.2d 502, 174 
Cal. Rptr. 701 (1981). We will discuss the impact of 
these factors in the instant case, bearing in mind that 
we take the totality of the circumstances into 
account. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). 
Standing of Accused and Victim in 
Community 
Defendant and the victim's mother had lived toge-
ther in Logan for only two weeks prior to the 
infant's disappearance. They were not married. 
Defendant has relatively long hair and at an earlier 
time wore a stud in one ear. At his preliminary 
hearing, there was testimony that he had been using 
drugs shortly before the child disappeared. All of this 
tends to depict him as being different from most 
residents in Cache County. The victim was three 
months old at the time of his disappearance. 
Size of the Community 
Logan, where the child lived at the time of his disa-
ppearance, is the county seat of Cache County and in 
1986 had an estimated population of 28,880. Cache 
County has an estimated population of 69,200. 
"(Tine smaller the community, the more likely 
there will be a need for a change of venue in any 
event when a heinous crime is committed." Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, All U.S. 539, 599-600 n.22 
(1976) (Brcnnan, J., concurring in the judgment). A 
populous metropolitan community will decrease the 
need for a change of venue. People v. Harris, 28 
Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); People v. Manson, 61 
Cal. App. 3d 102, 190, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 318 
(1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (refusal to 
move trial from Los Angeles area). In a small town, 
a major crime is likely to be embedded in the public 
consciousness with greater effect and for a longer 
time than it would be in a large, metropolitan area. Mar-
tinez v. Superior Court of Placer County. 
In the instant case, not only are we concerned with 
a small city and a small county, but during the 
month and one-half that the child was missing, 
there was a widespread community effort to help 
locate the missing child. The community's efforts 
were organized and directed by the wife of the 
bishop of a local ward of the city's predominant 
church. The ward's church building was used as the 
center for the volunteer activity. In addition to eighty-
six adult volunteers, offers of assistance came from 
three Girl Scout groups, a high school journalism 
class, the local relief societies of the predominant 
church, an Assembly of God church, and various 
local businesses. An appeal was made to school chi-
ldren of the community for envelopes and stamps for 
the purpose of sending out flyers. Thousands of 
flyers, posters, and envelopes were printed. The 
paper and the printing labor were donated. Sixteen 
thousand flyers were mailed out by Medmaster. 
Preparations were made for a nationwide effort to 
find the baby. Phones were donated, and pictures 
were printed by a grocery chain on grocery bags and 
distributed to 600 stores. A fast food restaurant 
printed thousands of tray place mats with the 
infant's picture. Besides the large contributions in 
material, labor, and postage, cash contributions 
exceeded $1,700. Much of that money was collected 
through small donations dropped into bottles which 
had been placed in grocery stores. One business in 
Logan loaned typewriters to the volunteers. Another 
business sent flyers out to all their employees. Phot-
ographic materials and labor were donated in prep-
aring photos of the missing child. Other businesses 
donated office supplies to assist the volunteers. A 
public utility supplying natural gas in an area sprea-
ding over three states, including Cache County, 
printed 500,000 copies of the story of the child's 
disappearance and mailed them with its monthly 
statements. Several fast food businesses provided 
lunches for the volunteers. 
The chairwoman of the volunteer committee testi-
fied that most of the volunteers "had some degree of 
emotional involvement in what they were doing" and, 
after the child's body was found and defendant had 
been charged with the killing, that she heard a news 
report that some of the volunteers "felt they had 
been a bit gullible." She denied that any volunteer 
had made that comment to her, but admitted that 
many people had expressed opinions to her concer-
ning defendant's guilt or innocence. She testified, 
however, that she personally was content to presume 
him innocent until he had been proved guilty. 
Nature and Gravity of the Offense 
The body of the three-month-old infant was 
found submerged in a river and weighted down with 
rocks. Defendant is charged with the intentional 
killing of his child, first degree murder, a capital 
offense which could be punishable by death. 
Nature and Extent of Publicity 
The disappearance of the child, the search effort, 
and the discovery of the child's body a month and 
one-half later generated extensive media coverage. 
Some of it was in connection with information diss-
eminated by the Logan Police Department. Other 
coverage was in connection with efforts to find the 
missing child, spearheaded by the volunteer commi-
ttee. Additional news stories came from direct cont-
act* oy reporters with the parents of the infant. The 
three television stations in Salt Lake City which can 
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be viewed in Cache County covered the events as 
follows: Television station KUTV, channel 2, carried 
eighty-four news items on thirty-four different 
days; KTVX, channel A carried thirty-six news 
items on twenty-five different days; KSL, channel 
5, carried thirty-eight news items on twenty-five 
different days. 
Newspaper coverage included forty-five news 
articles on forty-two different days in The Herald 
Journal, Logan's daily newspaper. The Cache 
Citizen, a Cache Valley weekly newspaper, published 
five feature articles. Moreover, two local radio stat-
ions carried numerous accounts of the events. 
Not only was the media coverage extensive, some 
of it also carried implications and innuendos of def-
endant's complicity in the child's disappearance. 
References were made to defendant's becoming 
"uncooperative," that he "was always the key 
suspect," and that he "persistently denied involve-
ment." Contrast was drawn between his tears and the 
"real ones" belonging to one of the volunteers. The 
statement was made that he "acted every inch the 
grieving father." It was further reported that "he 
even threatened to kill the detective who cracked the 
case." Moreover, some of the information dissemin-
ated by the police was equally troublesome, viz., that 
defendant had become uncooperative, that police 
wanted answers, that details related him to a Calif-
ornia abduction at knifepoint and a police investig-
ation of a California child abuse case where an 
infant sustained severe injuries, that the child's 
mother had passed a polygraph but that defendant 
twice refused to take one, that defendant was hostile 
to police, and that he was always the key suspect. 
Analysis and Conclusion 
The evidence on the foregoing four factors weighs in 
favor of granting a change of venue. Defendant, 
being a newcomer to Logan and having a lifestyle 
quite different from most of its residents, suffers 
from a lack of standing in the community. The 
victim was a helpless, innocent baby. Logan and 
Cache County are small, which weighs against defe-
ndant. Defendant stands charged with first degree 
murder, the only criminal offense in Utah which may 
be punishable by death. Because of the lapse of a 
month and one-half between the time the child 
disappeared and the time his body was found subm-
erged in a river, extensive news coverage was made 
of the disappearance, the search efforts, and the 
discovery of the body. Defendant was always a 
suspect because of his past record, and this fact was 
mentioned with others which cast suspicion upon him 
from the very start. 
While all of these facts weigh in favor of changing 
venue, we believe that there is in this case another 
factor which clinches our belief that a reasonable 
likelihood exists that defendant cannot receive a fair 
and impartial trial in Cache County. Unlike any case 
which has come before this Court where it has been 
contended that a change of venue should have been 
granted, in the instant case there was a widespread 
community effort to locate the missing child. This 
effort touched many adults, schoolchildren, and 
businesses. They responded with money, material, 
and countless hours of labor. This community invo-
lvement brought many people much closer to this 
alleged crime than ordinarily occurs. One television 
news story reported that the events had "touched the 
community at its very core"; another news release 
quoted a Logan resident as saying, "We're all talcing 
this very personally. It's as though someone lias 
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violated our homes ..- our families." In State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), State v. Pierre, 572 
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 
(1978), State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), 
and State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), all 
recent capital murder cases in which we held that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying 
motions for change of venue even though the crime 
in each case was heinous and aroused many of the 
populace, there was no community involvement. We 
believe this involvement gives the instant case a very 
different dimension and accentuates the difficulty in 
seating a jury which has not been touched in some 
way, either directly or through family or friends, 
with this crime, which played a prominent part in the 
lives of Cache County residents for a month and one-
half. 
The trial judge, in denying the motion for a 
change of venue, commented that "the easiest thing" 
for him to do would be to grant the motion, but that 
even though information prejudicial to defendant 
had been disseminated through the media, he did not 
find that its impact had been so great that he could 
not find twelve jurors in Cache County who could 
try the case without bias or prejudice against defen-
dant. He cited the testimony of the chairwoman of 
the volunteers, who stated that although she had 
been heavily involved in the search for the child, she 
had no opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence 
and would presume him to be innocent until proved 
guilty. We do not doubt the sincerity of the conclu-
sion of the trial judge, nor do we question the inte-
grity of the chairwoman's testimony. Jurors are 
commonly seated to hear felony trials after they have 
stated that despite hearing prejudicial information 
about the defendant and perhaps even having form-
ulated some opinion as to guilt, they would be able 
to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the 
case on the evidence presented at trial. This Court 
has upheld on appeal attacks against many jury ver-
dicts rendered under such circumstances. See State v. 
Lafferty and cases cited therein. We believe, 
however, that the instant case presents a set of circ-
umstances not usually found in criminal cases. Here, 
the impact of the alleged crime reached deeply into 
the community. Not only were residents exposed to 
media information on almost a daily basis, but also 
many adults and children assisted in one way or 
another in the month and one-half search effort. 
Although we do not doubt that twelve persons could 
be found who could honestly promise to set aside 
any prejudicial information which they had heard 
and any preconceived notions which they had 
formed, there are limits to what should reasonably be 
asked and expected of prospective jurors who have 
been exposed to the events surrounding the alleged 
crime. See State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987), 
where we reversed the trial court's denial of a chal-
lenge for cause made by the defendant against two 
jurors who were closely associated with members of 
the victim's family, but who, when pressed, stated 
that they would base their decision on the evidence 
and follow the law as instructed upon. 
Defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial need 
not be exposed to the risks which would attend the 
calling of the jury from Cache County. This is a 
capital case. Not only will a jury be required to det-
ermine the guilt or innocence of defendant, but if 
guilt is found, the jury will probably be urged by the 
prosecution to impose the death penalty. In deciding 
whether to impose the death penalty, the jury must 
weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
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circumstances. This is the most momentous judgment 
a jury can be asked to make. The judgment should 
be made in an atmosphere as free from any taint of 
bias or prejudice as is reasonably possible. Because 
of the unique circumstances of this case, it would not 
be fair or wise to either defendant or the residents of 
Cache County to require a Cache County jury to 
make that decision. 
Unlike any of the other cases coming before this 
Court where the trial court has denied a motion for a 
change of venue, this case has not yet been tried. 
This circumstance affords us the opportunity to 
review the denial before any error committed would 
be prejudicial to defendant. We are in accord with a 
statement made by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 
S. Q . 1507, 1522, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), that 
"reversals are but palliatives" and that "the cure lies 
in those remedial measures that will prevent the 
prejudice at its inception/ Later, the California 
court in Martinez v. Superior Court of Placer 
County expressed the same sentiment: 
Neither an accused whose life hangs in 
the balance nor the authorities charged 
with enforcing and administering the law 
should be required to face the possibility 
of a second trial when, as here, we face 
acute dangers to an impartial trial and 
when we can avoid them by the simple 
expedience of a change of venue. 
Martinez, 629 P.2d at 508,174 Cal. Rptr. at 707. 
In summary, the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion for a change of venue. Judicial 
economy will be served by now reversing the order 
denying the motion and granting the motion. The 
trial can then go forward in another county where a 
jury can be selected free from any taint of prejudice, 
and if a jury should convict defendant, its verdict 
would not be vulnerable to attack for community 
bias and hostility. This Court will then be spared the 
difficulty it encountered in State v. BeBcc, where we 
were of the opinion that "it would have been better if 
the trial court had granted the change under the cir-
cumstances of this case" but struggled to affirm the 
conviction in spite of that opinion. 
ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CRIMINAL RECORD 
Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(h) 
(1978, Supp. 1988). That section provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the first degree if the actor intention-
ally or knowingly causes the death of 
another under any of the following cir-
cumstances: 
(h) The actor was previously convicted 
of first or second degree murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. 
(Emphasis added.) It is alleged that he intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of his son and that he 
had been previously convicted of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to a person. Defendant 
complains that reading to a jury that he allegedly had 
been earlier convicted of a felony as part of the 
charging information before presentation of any 
evidence will be prejudicial because of the tendency 
of the jury to convict because he is a "bad person" , 
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rather than because he has been proved guilty of 
capital homicide. 
In other contexts, the legislature has recognized the 
prejudicial impact of presenting prior convictions of 
a defendant before a jury and has taken necessary 
precautions to insure that such prejudice based upon 
a defendant's "status" as a previously convicted 
felon will not taint a jury's fact-finding task. Our 
habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-
1002(2)(3) (1978) provides: 
(2) If the defendant is bound over to 
the district court for trial, the county 
attorney shall in the information or 
complaint set forth the felony committed 
within the state of Utah and the two or 
more previous felony convictions relied 
upon for the charge of being-a habitual 
criminal. If a jury is impaneled, it shall 
not be told of the previous felony conv-
ictions or charge of being a habitual 
criminal. The trial on the felony comm-
itted within the state of Utah shall 
proceed as in other cases. 
(3) If the court or jury finds the defe-
ndant guilty of the felony charged, then 
the defendant shall be tried immediately 
by the same judge and jury, if a jury was 
impaneled, on the charge of being a 
habitual criminal, unless the defendant 
has entered or enters a plea of guilty to 
the charge of being a habitual criminal. 
Thus, the court is prohibited from reading a hab-
itual criminal charge to a jury before guilt on the 
substantive offense is determined. Only if a verdict 
of guilty is returned can the jury, in a bifurcated 
proceeding, be presented evidence of past convict-
ions. See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1985), where we held it was an abuse of discretion 
for a trial court to deny a timely filed motion by a 
criminal defendant to separately try him on burglary 
and theft charges from a charge that he unlawfully 
possessed a firearm while he was a prison inmate 
housed in a halfway house. Utah Code Ann. §76-
10-503(2) (1978, Supp. 1988). The basis of our 
decision was to avoid any tendency on the part of the 
fact finder to convict him of burglary and theft 
because of the prior crime for which he was incarc-
erated. We affirm that evidence of prior crimes is 
generally presumed prejudicial and that "absent a 
reason for the admission of the evidence other than 
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excl-
uded. " Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. 
In order to avoid prejudice to the defendant in the 
instant case while the jury is deciding his guilt of the 
offense charged, we exercise our inherent supervisory 
power over trial courts and adopt the bifurcated 
approach advanced in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
498 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the 
result), and apply it to section 76-5-202(1 )(h). The 
jury is not initially to be presented with mention or 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction. If the jury 
finds him guilty of an intentional and knowing 
killing, it may then be instructed on the prior convi-
ction if the trial court determines that it qualifies 
under^section 76-5-202(1 )(h). The jury should then 
return to deliberate the existence or nonexistence of 
the prior conviction, which will, in turn, determine 
whether the homicide is first or second degree 
murder. "It is especially appropriate that we exercise 
that supervisory power to require certain procedures 
when fundamental values are threatened by other 
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modes of proceeding." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 499. 
Justice Zimmerman wrote: 
The legitimate interests of the state and 
the accused can easily be accommodated 
through a bifurcated procedure. When 
the underlying crime is charged, and 
enhancing circumstances involving other 
crimes or bad acts factually related to the 
underlying criminal episode are also 
charged for the purpose of increasing the 
severity of the punishment for the und-
erlying crime, the trial court must divide 
the trial into separate segments. First, 
evidence regarding the underlying crime 
should be admitted, and the jury should 
be asked to determine guilt or innocence 
based on that evidence alone. Second, if 
a guilty verdict is returned on the unde-
rlying charge, then evidence regarding 
the enhancing circumstances should be 
heard by the same jury for the purpose 
of determining whether those circumst-
ances have been proven beyond a reaso-
nable doubt. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 498. 
We reverse the order denying defendant's motion 
for a change of venue and grant the same. The trial 
court is directed to remove the case to another 
county "free from the objection" in accordance with 
section 77-35-29(e)(ii). There, the trial of defen-
dant shall proceed in accordance with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Kit C. Larson appeals from a summary 
judgment granted in favor* of his former employer, 
SYSCO Corporation, and his supervisors, defendants 
Robert Jenson and Robert Wagner, in a suit arising 
out of Larson's termination of employment. 
Larson was employed by SYSCO as a commissi-
oned salesman from March 1981 through April 1984. 
He worked under a written employment agreement 
which provided that his employment could be term-
inated by SYSCO at any time upon notice. Larson 
was terminated by his immediate supervisor, Wagner, 
without explanation except for the statement that he 
was to be "let go." SYSCO paid Larson all commis-
sions due him plus severance pay for a two-week 
period, representing approximately 30 percent per 
week more than that which he had earned as com-
missions immediately prior to his termination. 
SYSCO submitted to the Utah Department of Emp-
loyment Security the required "blue slip," which 
indicated that Larson's employment had been term-
inated for "poor performance." 
Larson subsequently filed this suit, alleging breach 
of contract, defamation, and the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress arising from the termina-
tion. After discovery was conducted, SYSCO moved 
for summary judgment on all of Larson's claims. 
The motion was granted. Larson brings this appeal, 
assailing the grant of summary judgment and the 
denial of his motion to amend his complaint. 
I. 
Larson contends that there are numerous issues of 
disputed fact which should have precluded the grant 
of summary judgment. First, he argues that the 
manner of his termination did not comply with the 
provision of the written employment contract gove-
rning notice to be afforded him upon termination. In 
this respect, the agreement provides: 
Employee's employment with the 
Company may be terminated at any time 
by the Company or by Employee upon 
proper written notice. Proper notice is 
related to the length of employment as 
follows: ... over one (1) year employ-
ment, two weeks' notice. 
Larson worked for SYSCO for more than three years 
and under the contract was entitled to two weeks' 
written notice. It is undisputed that after the emplo-
yment contract had been executed, SYSCO revised its 
policy concerning employee termination, and instead 
of giving the employee the advance notice required 
by the contract, it terminated the employee without 
notice but provided him with severance pay for a 
period of time equal to the advance-notice time 
specified in the contract. This was done in response 
to SYSCO's experience that sales performance typi-
cally declined after receiving written notice of term-
ination. We find no violation of the contract by this 
policy. Larson was entitled to two weeks' advance 
notice. He received pay for two weeks but was reli-
eved of the obligation to render any services during 
that time. This left him free to seek other employ-
ment while enjoying full pay without any employ-
ment responsibility. 
Larson contends that the legality of his termination 
should be determined according to Idaho law inas-
much as the written agreement provided that *[i]n 
the event of any dispute arising under this agreement, 
: STATE OF UTAH, J] 
Plaintiff. I ) 'mmmmm 
«.d Ell if ] Ca,,eNo' 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit was made before me this day by 
at there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, (in the daytime) ( **y**ttttrr**t-**' 
girt), of the person of 
the vehicles described as \°l 1<£ fonh Vc/ C, L>fqb /'Ufa 
bjoC 
the premises described as "7 o ~y ^,^^^ I i , J si O i * t < -IL 
r the following property: ,; - / - / / 
If you find any of the property described above, or any purt thereof, bring it before 
» immediately at his court and make return within 10 days, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
action 77-23-1 et seq. 
You fcaos5p)(are not) authorized to execute this search warrant without giving prior 
itice of you authority and purpose. 
ite signed / O - / / - ^ Time signed /$.'*/? 
MagUtr 
*k O 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
Vi. 




PROPERTY RECEIPT, INVENTORY, ANDltSaSSM 
Case No. 
I, the officer undersigned, acknowledge receiving the property described 
below, on the date, and time shown, from: 
Pe rson 
Place 7 ^ 7 Ci 'Sfp fed 
Da te lO'lH-^ Time / > , ' / / 
Officer serving Searc^r Warrant" 
Property seized: <ff QoA'n^^ nC ft'frr,~<hf<r VQfxv* <,tr<> 
^ i K c g . COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICH COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH. >
 n p0R ^  WARRANT 
Plaintiff, \ 
' ., , \ Case No. 
Defendant. ) 
AFFIDAVIT 
RICH COUNTY ) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss 
Affiant, being first duly sworn, states on oath that: 
1 OFFICER. I am a peace officer in the State of Utah employed for J Z ^ 
y e a r ? PRR0PCERTYC° P r o p e r t y or evidence for which a search warrant " I 
sought is described as follows:^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 Ml/Ujqo^t^ Bc^t £<«»& 
toI'UUO„•&£},- ..:. Lee/ CQnk £sf/,0f £*fh/ 
3. LOCATION. I have probable cause * * " ™ * ^ ^ & $ ^ M 
1s located on the ^person ^vehicle i P ^ J J ^ ^ n could be found by as: (the description must Be so specific that the location cou.a 
one not knowing where i t is)^ ^ ^ ^
 /rJ ^ f{9W< c*6>* " * * « /o3 ^ M 
X 3 ? « X i <* •' ^  "y - u> "tM ~r **> '• 
Akv « * < * Hi/t QJo^ot'h i*fi*$ »M foist f/J<L AaAKT 
aavit xor iearcn warrant, page d 
4. STATUTORY GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe this property or 
evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with name of crime) 
_^__was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
Has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit 
or conceal the commission of the offense of 
5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in this affidavit 
as though set forth herein: (list written informants' statements, documentary 






6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in 
the night as follows: (state why property may be concealed, damaged, altered 
or other good reason). 
™ n ^ ? + 5 *lu * ^ ^ the fo1 lowing evidence which allows the search to be 
conducted without notice of authority and purpose: (state
 wny the object of 
S L S w . J ^ ! quickly destroyed, disposed of or secreted or why physical 
harm may result to a person if notice is given) 
1nfoJEs? U S INF0RMANTS- The Allowing are designations of anonymous 
I^irJ^ 1 1* 1^ 1s w i t n n e l d because (state why the informant would be endangered 
or his usefulness destroyed if name was stated) 
thesJEri«il:iTY'/ I b?1!uve t h e info™ants named herein to be reliable for tnese reasons: (check those that apply) 
the following informants made statements against their penal interest: 
this mitter?6 ( S l ? l l 2 t i n ! h ! S n ? a r e C1'Ji2en i n f o ™ e r s ^ have no interest in » matter. iai$o state which ones are known to you personalis 
.the following informants are peace officers with the departments noted: 
inforia^-and 2JlTM?™bISlH«?h*re I*!1*516 b e c a u s e < s t a t e t h e narae o f each tacts corroborating his statement or previous reliable statements) 
Rene* tz*c\fv /V He wes of tit oU Xock sU^,*U &&m 
beer +Ut w*t founJ M Me TtSiJ&ct . <U ql*o Je& f >iec/ Uz 
n't for Search Warrant, page 5 
exists ?oJtL C ?« E ' T h e / ° l l o w i n g facts establish that probable cause 
til case state how ^ L ° ! a Search Wa.rrant: < s t a t e the Wi f i c facts of 
an? ss'i^su^s^^^^iSi.;^the date they were observed 
'e«e« €*</y U, <s Ur otJnef cf fU o/J fact *•&(* >'* 4*kSon*, f,r< 
CeA/'/f«r hJj<+$l /epl kef r /e /e a«c/ / 4 / «*« A<fJ Itt" cefxx<ili<^ 
Sfuofe oh'^l d»Jrf kit 6>«l. S*« Jw'lrJ #>* S*J.Wdu*l «* # e 
1,-M *W *". 4* W Ur^\ ^ mr "'li^f 
, he ia<J yes. y*,/ apf.c,^ q^foj A,^ if U-e Ci"U folk o£ejf JcvnC 
UQl STOleti , the de^-e^cfqAjSfotf^J t'Wr lie <J>J/* T xctse Qny&eef 
W i/\h Ue A fffvht fofh'm of Mr rod** utbeJ*- &*<n( oi^er Ai*/t3 
<>tti»j 4fos»J,?3 /ou^a PPi'tfiJ- AAVf/ /*/© / /r few*, a /hllkqol(t^S 
hee< Cc^ w* *i4li«3 i'* plo>« vlc>J <?« Me f/oor
 AeQr Uc Joof, M*M y9u/ 
1 fried 4o df/^i lb JefendQuf- * ^''jif //tf"eJ ^J^ur qff*n'n{ A^J 
Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 6. 
DATE SIGNED: TIME SIGNED: 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 19 
Magistrate 
aTATF. OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF RICH 
CITY OF 
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
ENNOTiaTOAPFUlBEKMU 
HH>AT_ 
NAME (lent) &"»> 
/ ^ ^ 
ADDMSS .• • . (C.ty) , . -
Slot* ' 
(M,ddl«) DOB 
Driver Lk*m« NA. 
Vehido Color 
>RB£F0RETHE2AJDAY0r, 
HE HOUR Or 
















THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: &jf %',??*. 
Q^TAHCODf DCOUNTYCODE D CITY CODE. NO:* 
- y ? ^ 
O N T r * _ L _OAYOf_ 10 • » MILITARY TIME. 
LOCATION, MttE POST NO. 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
Of CONVICTlON/FOIfMTJiei; 
Spooling. 
_MPH in o . .Zone 
MPH 
OVER 
INTERSTATE D YES O NO STOP SIGN f S 
-SUSPENDED-
WiTHOUT ADMITTING GUHT I PROWSE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN ON OR BEFORE:. 





iHy Q Minimum 
t Guilty D Intermediate 
4eHed toil D Maximum 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY Of THIS SU< 
TO LAW ON THEykfrQyt DATE 
DID COMMIT TOE OfFpfeTpClLEtl 
DEPUTY 
COMPIAINAIJT jV/L> (LflCfayArt 
AND INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT ACCORDING 
>W OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT 
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. • <r—v 
NUMBER ' & _JT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 
D 
DATE. . A . D . I * .JUDGE. 
WHITE- Court 1 
WHITE - Court 7 
CANARY-
Defendant 
PINK - Auditor 
BLUE - Deputy 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET NO. 
